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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to challenge the assumption that small member state influence on the European 
Union’s (EU) common foreign policy has been negligible. Its purpose is to study the influence 
of two small member states, Latvia and Lithuania, have had on the Eastern Partnership initiative 
during their respective Presidency of the Council of the EU periods. A third case, Poland’s 
Presidency, will also be examined and compared with the other two cases. This will allow for 
a more nuanced understanding of the impact the other two small member states have had in the 
development of the EaP compared to a bigger member state. Overall, this thesis adds to the 
existing discussion of small member state influence in three ways: first, it provides an overview 
of classical and contemporary small member state literature and critically assesses the realist 
interpretation of small state behavior in the international system; second, it reviews the different 
methodologies used by various authors and synthesizes a new influence measuring framework; 
and third, it applies the analytical framework to the selected cases and tests three sets of 
hypothesis.  
I argue that three factors can most adequately explain small member state influence: first, small 
member states must be committed to an issue - it must be of general importance to them; second, 
they must possess immaterial resources, such as general expertise or they be recognized as 
leaders in the issue area; and third, small member states are more influential when they use the 
EU’s institutional setting (such as the Council Presidency seat) to their advantage. The actual 
extent of influence is measured using three indicators: goal achievement, the ascription of 
agenda setting, and the ascription of final outcomes. This exercise revealed three conclusions: 
first, that small states have more influence on the multilateral Eastern Partnership platforms 
than on bilateral relationships; second, that small member states have more influence on the 
final outcomes than on the agendas; and third, that the overall goal achievement level is higher 
when the level of ascription is higher. Based on the results this thesis produced, I conclude that 
small member states are able to exert a limited amount of influence on the EU’s foreign policy 
when they use their strengths and resources to leverage their positions vis-à-vis bigger and more 
powerful member states, but without the support of other actors, the probability of failing to 
deliver results would be higher.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis sets out to challenge the assumption that small member state influence on the 
European Union’s (EU) common foreign policy has been negligible. Its purpose is to study the 
influence of two small member states, Latvia and Lithuania, have had on the Eastern Partnership 
initiative. Although some previous studies on the topic of small member state role on EU 
foreign policy exist, many authors “continue to disregard small states”1, stating that the 
“available case studies in International Relations (IR) heavily concentrate on great powers, and 
thus look only at one particular sample of states”2 with some authors suggesting that “bigger 
EU member states exert much more influence than small ones” and that “small states are not 
left much choice other than to follow the “rules of the game” of large states”3.  
We can distinguish between two types of small state literature: one focusing on the systemic 
level and the other on the state level of analysis. The earliest works dealt with the system level 
of analysis and “were foremost preoccupied by the question of the survival of small states 
among the big powers”4, whereas the works focusing on the system level of analysis referred 
to the “general environment which is impossible or very difficult for a small state to change, 
the state level of analysis relates to more direct causes of small state behavior”5. While scholarly 
work focusing on the systemic level of analysis tried to explain small state behavior in a more 
abstract terms, “the progressive development of the EU has made several scholars turn their 
attention to the position of small states in Europe”, and has “resulted in a proliferation of studies 
which have almost exclusively focused on the strategies of small states”6.  
This thesis aims to provide new understanding about the role small member states play in EU’s 
common foreign policy and to examine if , to what extent and in what manner small member 
states have influenced one of the largest EU foreign policy initiatives – the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP). Although “new” small member states are faced with several disadvantages due to their 
                                                          
1 Nasra, Skander. 2010. „Weak Power, Great Influence: Small States in EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Belgium 
and Greece“. Presented at the Coherence, Consensus and Conflict in EU External Affairs Conference, Brussels 
2 Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004. “Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International Relations” 
Institute of International Affairs – University of Iceland Working Paper: 2. 
3 Pastore, Gunta. 2013. “Small New Member States in the EU Foreign Policy: Towards Small State Smart 
Strategy?” Baltic Journal of Political Science 2: 68. 
4 Skander, Nasra. 2010: 2. 
5 Lindell, Ulf., Persson, Stefan. 1986. “The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview.” 
Conflict and Cooperation 21: 80. 
6 Skander, Nasra. 2010: 2.  
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lower share of bargaining and voting powers and lower financial and administrative capacities7, 
I argue that small member states, with varying success, can still influence EU foreign policy in 
all phases of the policy-making process from agenda-setting to policy design and policy 
implementation. 
Overall, this thesis adds to the existing discussion of small member state influence in three 
ways: first, it provides an overview of classical and contemporary small member state literature 
and critically assesses the realist interpretation of small state behavior in the international 
system; second, it reviews the different methodologies used by various authors and synthesizes 
a new influence measuring framework; and third, it applies the analytical framework to the 
selected three cases. The analytical framework will be applied to a comparative study of two 
small member states and their respective Presidency of the Council of the EU periods – Latvia 
and Lithuania, which ran from January to June 2015 and July to December 2013. This will 
allow me to contextualize the Council Presidencies in a theoretical framework and to test 
whether it holds up against the research problem of this thesis. A third case, Poland’s Presidency 
(July to December 2011), will also be examined and compared with the other two cases. This 
will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the impact the other two small member states 
had in the development of the EaP compared to a bigger member state. 
The Eastern Partnership initiative, which is part of the European Neighborhood Policy and 
launched in Prague on 7 May 2009, seeks to “deepen and strengthen relations between the 
European Union and its six Eastern neighbors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine”8. More specifically, the “EaP was devised to pursue a novel two-track 
approach of bi- and multilateral relations with EU’s eastern neighbors – through new 
contractual agreements, joint policy platforms, flagship initiatives and a variety of supportive 
technical and financial instruments – to ensure the partner countries closer approximation 
towards the EU”9. I chose it as an overarching case because it was a priority policy area for all 
three countries during their time as the Council president. Accordingly, “small states tend to be 
proactive in EU negotiations where they do have important economic and political interests at 
                                                          
7 Panke, Diana. 2008. „The Influence of Small States in the EU: Structural Disadvantages and 
Counterstrategies“. UCD Dublin European Institute Working Papers 3: 24. 
8 The European Commission. “Eastern Partnership”. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-
partnership/index_en.htm 
9 Korosteleva, Elena., Natorski, Michal., Simao, Licinia. 2013. “The Eastern Dimension of the European 
Neighborhood Policy: Practices, Instruments and Social Structures.” East European Politics 29: 257-258. 
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stake, while being reactive in sectors of limited interest to them10”. For Latvia, “ever since 
launching of the Eastern Partnership initiative, it has been a priority in Latvia’s foreign policy 
and included it among its priorities for the Presidency of the Council of the EU”11. For 
Lithuania, the Eastern Partnership “has been a priority from the very beginning of initiation of 
the project”12 and for Poland the Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2011 was 
one of the central events of their Council presidency13. The Council Presidency itself is an 
important vehicle that is be used by member states to exert influence on common EU policy. 
But despite the post-Lisbon Treaty limitations on the Council presidency, which saw the foreign 
policy agenda-setting competencies granted to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, member states can still realize their influence on the common 
foreign policy14. But important questions remain: compared to big states, can small member 
states influence EU foreign policy? If so, how much influence can they exert? How can we 
explain their influence? These are the main research questions this thesis attempts to answer.  
This thesis has three main sections. The first section provides a review of the general small state 
literature and the different small state conceptualizations. It aims to give an overview of the 
early debates on small state role and influence in the international system with a focus on both 
the system and the state level of analysis in general IR and EU studies literature. It then provides 
a summary of the contemporary debate while generating the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis. Starting from a discussion of the theoretical principles that different scholars have used 
in order to explain small member state influence, I highlight commitment, immaterial resources 
and the utilization of EU policy initiatives as the factors that can best explain the influence of 
small member states on the EU’s foreign policy.  
The second chapter provides the research design and talks about the pros and cons of a small-
N methodology. Namely, the main benefit of a small-N design is that the “case-oriented” (rather 
than “variable-oriented”) nature of the research design allows to analyze the “unfolding of 
                                                          
10 Thorhallsson, Baldur., Wivel, Anders. 2006. “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and 
What Would We Like to Know?” In Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19: 659. 
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. 2015. “The Eastern Partnership – a Component of the 
European Neighborhood Policy”. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/eastern-partnership 
12 Ghazaryan, Anna. 2013. “Eastern Partnership was priority from the very beginning – Interview of Lithuanian 
Ambassador in Armenia.” http://www.urm.lt/am/en/news/eastern-partnership-was-priority-from-the-very-
beginninginterview-of-lithuanian-ambassador-in-armenia 
13 Kaczynski, Piotr Maciej. 2011. Polish Council Presidency 2011: Ambitions and Limitations. Stockholm: Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies: 38. 
14 Kaznowski, Adam. 2014. „Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies 
on the Development of the Eastern Partnership“. EU Diplomacy Paper 6. 
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events and variations in political developments within each country rather than the variation in 
macro-variables between countries”15. Although no political development on the EU scale ever 
happens in a vacuum, a macro-variable study is not what this thesis seeks to accomplish. Still, 
when the goal is to explain the extent of influence small member countries have on a certain 
policy outcome, one needs to provide a set of variables that have had an impact on the end 
result. The outcome this thesis seeks to explain is influence. Some authors, like Thorhallsson 
and Wivel (2006), have identified three clusters of variables - realist, liberalist and 
constructivist, each utilizing the general insights of IR theory16. Other authors have looked at 
both systemic level (structure of the policy area, state of the policy area, norms) and at state 
level (commitment, network capital, immaterial resources, deliberation) variables17. In the 
second chapter, I provide an overview of the different methodologies authors have utilized in 
the past. The goal is to synthesize a new novel way to measure small state influence.  
The third and last chapter apples the analytical and methodological framework developed in the 
last two chapters to the three selected cases – the Council Presidencies of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland. In the first part of the chapter, I provide a synopsis of the history of the European 
Neighborhood Policy, development of the Eastern Partnership initiative and the EU Council 
Presidency institution. I also look at the use of the Council Presidency as a tool to exert 
influence, the commitment to the Eastern Partnership initiative and the immaterial resources of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The final part of the chapter is devoted to individual case analysis 
and comparison. The thesis ends with a general conclusion and a discussion on the delivered 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Landman, Todd. 2008. Issues and Methods in Comparative Polics: An Introduction. London: Routledge: 69. 
16 Thorhallsson, Baldur., Wivel, Anders. 2006: 656.  
17 Nasra, Skander. 2010: 4. 
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1. EXPLAINING SMALL STATE BEHAVIOUR 
I begin this chapter by asking a simple question: what is a small state? In other words – how 
can we conceptualize small states? The answer may seem obvious, but scholars are divided on 
the subject. After discussing the different definitions, I present a conceptualization that I will 
use throughout this thesis. In short, I look at both objective (such as population size and gross 
domestic product) and subjective (the state’s own perception of its smallness) variables. The 
next two subchapter will discuss small state literature in general IR. After presenting an 
overview of the debates that have shaped the general discourse, I will examine the 
contemporary small state literature in EU studies. The final part of the first chapter will 
concentrate on synthesizing a theoretical approach which can adequately explain small state 
influence on EU foreign policy.  
1. 1 Conceptualizing small states 
Conceptualization is an important first step in any social scientific endeavor and constructing a 
working definition of small states is critical in order to examine small member state influence 
on the EU’s foreign policy. This is made difficult by the different range of definitions used by 
scholars when they talk about small states. There is “no one overarching definition18” and the 
concept is “contested in the theory and practice of international and European affairs19”. 
Generally, we can distinguish between two types of definitions, each taking into consideration 
different types of criteria. There are the conceptualizations that define small states using 
objective factors (quantifiable data) and there are authors who define small states using 
subjective criteria, looking at how states themselves define their size. Then there are authors 
who combine both factors and include both material and subjective criteria in their definition. 
An overview of the various methods used to measure state size is summarized in table 1.  
Scholars who employ objective factors usually identify four variables used to define the size of 
states: population size, land area and total income (measured as cross domestic product – GDP) 
and military capacity20. Defining the size of states using these four variables “has its roots in 
nineteenth century Europe when the success of states was primarily seen in terms of their 
defense capacity and territorial foreign expansion, military capacity being a necessary 
                                                          
18 Archer, Clive., Nugent, Neill. 2002. “Introduction: Small States and the European Union”. Current Politics and 
Economics of Europe 11: 2.  
19 Thorhallsson, Baldur., Wivel, Anders. 2006: 652. 
20 Thorhallsson, Baldur. 2006. „The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual 
Perspectives“. European Integration 28: 7.  
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feature21”. Historically, population size “has frequently been used to measure country size, with 
the definition of “small” being based essentially on arbitrary cut-off levels22”. Over time, these 
cut-off levels have varied greatly between authors. For example, Kuznets (1958) defines small 
states as those states that have a population of 10 million or smaller, while Gylfason (1999) 
categorized states as “small” when their population is 2 million or less23. But using population 
as the only factor to assess state size poses a problem. Any cut off point, be it 10 or 2 million, 
is inherently arbitrary. For example, should we categorize a country with a population of 2.1 
million as “big” or “small”? A dichotomous classification system may have worked during the 
“European concert in the 19th century or superpower rivalry during the Cold War when the great 
powers could easily be distinguished from the rest24”, but not today. A need to compliment 
“big” and “small” with additional categories was apparent.  
Table 1. Methods and variables used to measure the size of states.  
 
Source: Summarized by author.   
Adding land area, GDP and military expenditure to the mix may give us a more nuanced 
definition. Crowards (2002) uses three of these variables (population, land area and GDP) to 
categorize 190 states and on this basis classified 79 countries as “small” with “medium-small” 
and “medium-large” serving as the “middle” categories25. Other authors have also added 
                                                          
21 Ibid: 8. 
22 Crowards, Tom. 2002. “Defining the Category of “Small” States”. In Journal of International Development 14: 
144. 
23 Kuznets, Simon. 1958. „Economic growth in small nations“. Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, 
eds. Austin Robinson. London: Macmillan Co. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur. 1999. „Exports, Inflation and Growth“. International Monetary Fund Working Papers 27: 
9.  
24 Thorhallsson, Baldur., Wivel, Anders. 2006: 653. 
25 Crowards, Tom. 2002. 
Exclusion 
method
• A small 
state is a 
state that is 
not a "Great 
Power"
Objective 
variables
• Population
• Territory
• GDP
• Military 
expenditure
• Size of 
diplomatic corps
Subjective 
variables
• Size 
determined 
by discourse
Hybrid method
• Size determied 
by combining 
both subjective 
and objective 
variables
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“micro” to the mix (states such as Monaco, Liechtenstein and Vatican City)26 with the literature 
“congealing around issues of sovereignty and action capacity – on how dependence on other 
polities in formulating and conducting policy impinges on that policy27”. But using a 
population/land area mix is fraught with its own complications. Should we classify Mongolia, 
the 19th biggest country in terms of land area and a population of 3 million people, as a small, 
medium or a big country compared to, for example, the Netherlands - a country with a 
population of almost 17 million people, but with a total area that positions it as the 134th 
“biggest” country in the world. Other traditional variables such as GDP and military 
expenditure have also been utilized and combined with population and territory figures in order 
to define state size, but as Thorhallsson (2006) argues, this exercise has had limited success 
“because these four variables may well have been suited to describing the size of states in the 
old international system where military capacity was the key to the survival of states; manpower 
for military purpose was highly important; the size of the economy was a basis for building up 
the militia; and states attached importance to concrete territorial gains28”. In the end, “a 
judgmental element must creep into the exercise of categorizing states by size29”.  
Trying to overcome the fact that defining “smallness” objectively is fraught with difficulties, 
some authors have instead argued that size is actually a social construction30. Social 
constructivism (or just constructivism) raises the meta-theoretical issue: “whether things are 
given and correctly perceived by our senses (empiricism), or whether the things we perceive 
are rather the product of our conceptualization (constructivism)31”. Using the constructivist way 
to define state size entails analyzing discourse in order to determine how states themselves 
perceive their size in the international community and vice versa. Robert Rothstein defines the 
status of “small powers” using this factor, arguing that “the Small power is not defined by 
specific qualities which it possesses (or lacks) but rather by a position it occupies in its own and 
other’s eyes32”.  
                                                          
26 Archer, Clive., Nugent, Neill. 2002: 3. 
27 Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004: 6. 
28 Thorhallsson, Baldur. 2006: 12-13. 
29 Archer, Clive., Neil, Nugent. 2002. “Introduction: Small States and the European Union”. Current Politics and 
Economics of Europe 11: 5.  
30 Panke, Diana. 2008: 3. 
Hanf, Kenneth., Soetendorp, Ben, eds. 1998. Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European 
Union. New York: Routledge. 
31 Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2009. „Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters“. Approaches and 
Methodologies in Social Sciences, eds. Michael Keating., Donatella Della Porta. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 81. 
32 Rothstein, L. Robert. 1968. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press: 27. 
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Alternatively, author such as Raimo Väyrynen, Cliver Archer and Neill Nugent have combined 
material (such as size of diplomatic corps and GDP) with subjective factors. Although set down 
44 year ago, Väyrynen (1971) and his summary of the different ways small states have been 
measured (see table 2) still resonates today. In his analysis, he identifies two axes: 
objective/subjective and endogenous/exogenous. The first is the “objective and subjective 
measure of rank with the former meaning the measurement of rank by some “hard” aggregate 
variables” and the second is the endogenous/exogenous rank with “the former measuring the 
internal properties of the actor, while exogenous ranks are determined by means of judgement 
and perceptions of external actors33”.  
Table 2. Types of rank analysis used by Väyrynen (1971). 
 Endogenous rank Exogenous rank 
Objective rank Rank measured by aggregate 
variables, like area, 
population, GDP, military 
budget, value of industrial 
production, etc. 
Rank measured by the 
amount or value of 
interaction received from a 
given set of actors. 
Subjective rank Politicians or general 
public’s view of its own 
state’s size and capability.  
External actors (foreign 
governments) view of a 
state’s size and capability.  
Source: Raimo, Väyrynen. 1971, 93.  
To conclude this section, we now turn to the working definition used in this thesis.  
1.2 Conceptualizing small member states in the EU 
As it turned out, defining what constitutes a small state in the international system is not always 
as clear cut as it may appear. Turning now to the working conceptualization used in this thesis, 
I ask: how can we define what constitutes a small state in the EU? The easiest way to go about 
this exercise is to define small member states using the number of votes in the Council or the 
amount of members of parliament (MP’s) in the European Parliament (EP). Seats in the EP are 
allocated on the basis of only one variable: the population of each member state34. As this thesis 
takes a closer look at only three cases (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), it would be redundant to 
                                                          
33 Raimo, Väyrynen. 1971. “On the definition and measurement of small power status”. In Cooperation and 
Conflict 6: 92.  
34 The European Parliament. “MEP’s”. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/about-meps.html 
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conduct a thorough case study of all the 28 EU member states using both objective and 
subjective variables. I’m using two size categories, “small” and “big”, and excluding “micro” 
and “medium” as the aim of this thesis is to compare two small (Latvia and Lithuania) with one 
big (Poland) state. So in order not to overcomplicate things, I’ll use only one variable to 
determine the relationship between these three cases – allocated seats in the EP. In short, this 
thesis defines small states as states which possess less than the EU-28 average of MP’s in the 
Parliament (751 total MEP’s divided by 28 member states equals 26.8 MEP’s). 21 member 
states fall into this category (marked green on Table 3) with only the Netherlands in between 
the two categories.  Below (table 3) is a classification of all 28 member states based on the 
number of MEP’s in the Parliament. Even without adding a cut-off point we can already see 
that Poland with its 51 MEP’s and Lithuania, Latvia with 11 and 8 MEP’s respectively are at 
the opposite ends of the table.  
Table 3. EU member states divided by size and the number of MEP’s. 
1. Germany 96 15. Austria 18 
2. France 74 16. Bulgaria 17 
3. Italy 73 17. Denmark 13 
4. UK 73 18. Finland 13 
5. Spain 54 19. Slovakia 13 
6. Poland 51 20. Croatia 11 
7. Romania 32 21. Ireland 11 
8. Netherlands 26 22. Lithuania 11 
9. Belgium 21 23. Latvia 8 
10. Czech Rep. 21 24. Slovenia 8 
11. Greece 21 25. Cyprus 6 
12. Hungary 21 26. Estonia 6 
13. Portugal 21 27. Luxembourg 6 
14. Sweden 20 28. Malta 6 
Source: The European Parliament. “MEP’s”. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/about-
meps.html 
 
1.3 Small state theory in International Relations  
The proliferation of small states after the end of the Cold War has not matched the analytical 
focus they deserve. Indeed, Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) argue that the “extant scholarship in 
the IR discipline has focused almost exclusively on great powers, while small states have been 
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a residual category” and that the “lack of an agreed concrete definition of small states has also 
very much marked the body of literature that might be termed small state studies35”. Steinmetz 
and Wivel (2010) argue that “the study of small states is plagued by a lack of cumulative 
insights and coherent debate” as “there is no agreement on how we should define small states, 
what similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how small states influence 
international relations36 (see also Antola and Lehtimäki 2001; Knudsen 2002; Archer and 
Nugent 2002). 
There is no common “Small State Theory” and the authors are loosely tied by their conviction 
that size matters37. The confusion extends to the exact beginning of a truly genuine “school of 
small state studies”. Some authors mention the aftermath of the Second World War and the 
emergence of IR as an independent academic institution as the beginning of an integrated corpus 
of knowledge that is known today as “small state theory”38 while Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) 
point out that scholars were already “interested in the study of small state throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” and that “larger academic interest in small states returned 
with a study of the wartime diplomacy of small states by Baker Fox (1959), which marked the 
beginning of a genuine school of small state studies39”.  
This kind of scholarship that included or focused exclusively on explaining small state behavior 
in the international system proliferated in the 1950 – 1960s. Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) quote 
Höll (1978) who identifies three reasons for this new interest in small states: “first, the “bias” 
towards great powers and the U.S., with American research increasingly perceived as making 
for a deficit of the IR discipline, in particular in the Scandinavian scientific community (Kirt 
and Waschkuhn (2001) even argue that one can distinguish between two schools of “small state 
studies”: an American (or Anglo-Saxon) and a European – Scandinavian/German40); second, 
the rapid social changes at the end of the 1960s brought traditional political science approaches 
                                                          
35 Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004: 7. 
36 Steinmetz, Robert., Wivel, Anders. 2010. Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities. Farmham: 
Ashgate: 4. 
37 Hans, Mouritzen., Wivel, Anders, eds. 2005. „Europe and the Nation State“. The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic 
Integration. London: Routledge: 9.  
38 Griffiths, Richard., Pharo, Helge. 1995. „Small States and European Integration – Literature survey and 
anaysis“. Arena Working Paper: 19. 
39 Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004: 7. 
40 Romain, Kirt., Waschkuhn, Arno. 2001. Kleinstaaten-Kontient Europa: Probleme und Perspektiven. Baden-
Baden: Nomos: 25 
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into question; and third, increasing international interdependence raised issues of how states 
with limited capabilities coped with costs of dependence41”.  
This period in the midst of the Cold War is characterized by scholarship that was concerned 
mainly with state survival and alignment policy with discussion focusing on whether small 
states can survive on their own in the international system. Some of the more influential work 
from this period include Rothstein’s book (1968) “Alliances and Small Powers”, Keohane’s 
(1969) article “Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics” and Vital’s book 
(1971) “The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict”. Their 
work is mainly concerned with balance of power issues and political, economic and military 
power imbalances between “Great” and “Small” nations.  
The main arguments stem from the realist scholarship and are as follows: 1) the main actors of 
the international system are states; 2) the state of the international system is anarchic and 
therefore no single state dominates; 3) “Great Power” interests can override “Small Power” 
interests because of their limited material base; 4) therefore non-alignment is dangerous for 
“Small Powers”; 5) ergo in search of security, “Small Powers” have more incentive to form, 
join and work through alliances. Rothstein explains that “Small Powers” ought to prefer mixed, 
multilateral alliances because “they provide the most benefits in terms of security and political 
influence” and “if unavailable, [Small Powers] should probably choose a Small Power Alliance 
in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance, particularly if the Small Powers do not fear an 
immediate threat to their security, and if their goals in allying are primarily political42”. The 
authors are therefore also pessimistic about the extent of “Small Power” influence in the 
international system. Vital, in his 1980 book The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small 
Power in International Relations, denies a significant political role for alliances and states that 
“the coalition or alliance is not an effective unit of foreign policy and strategy at all, except in 
the narrow, if extremely important, respect that it can from time to time marshal great strength” 
because a “coalition requires collective leadership and the sinking of national interest as 
individually defined by each member states” which in turn leads to the domination of bigger 
coalition members over the smaller ones43. But Vital also argues that acting alone carries its 
                                                          
41 Otmar, Höll. 1978. “Kritische Anmerkungen zur Kleinstaaten-Theorie”. In Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Politikwissenschaft 7: 260.  
42 Rothstein, L. Robert. 1968: 177.  
43 Vital, David. 1980. The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. Santa 
Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group: 186.  
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own dangers and states that choose to act on their own face high costs of independence44. 
Following the logic of this argument, small states are disadvantages when acting alone, but also 
when joining coalitions that include “bigger powers”. These conclusions are not surprising 
considering realist suspicions towards the importance of coalitions and alliances in general.  
But then again these studies have to be placed in their temporal context. The Cold War was 
raging and the majority of countries these studies refer to as “Great Powers” were part of the 
“Third World” or states that were not aligned with either NATO or the Communist Bloc. All in 
all, this was a time when the relevance of systemic factors were emphasized and a case was 
being made for the argument that a small state’s ability to act is dependent on the character of 
the international system in which they exist45. This in turn created a whole branch of new 
research that focused on strategies that can help small states mitigate these structural constrains 
and increase their influence. According to Lindell and Persson (1986), discussion at that time 
centered on: first, alignment policy, where the discussion centered on whether non-alignment 
is more advantageous than joining alliances; second, how small powers can exploit “Great 
Power” weaknesses to their own advantage; and third, on how small states can choose certain 
diplomatic tactics in order to increase their influence when negotiating with stronger states46. 
Vogel (1983) also supplies an analytical framework that identifies structurally determined 
behavior and voluntary strategies of small states that help them mitigate structural constrains 
on their behavior that includes corporatism and membership in international organizations47.  
Baehr’s (1975) conclusion about the insufficiency of the “small state” concept as an analytical 
tool signaled a waning interest in small state studies in the 1980s. He argued that because they 
“form too broad a category for purposes of analysis” and “if all states, with the possible 
exception of two [U.S. and the USSR], are “small”, one might as well abandon smallness as a 
focus of study48”. The general size of states started to matter less to scholars. This was also the 
time when more and more scholars turned their attention to European small states. The 
popularity of neoliberal institutionalism and the general focus on international regimes and 
institutions, the decline of U.S. hegemony, the rise of global interdependence, the erosion of 
                                                          
44 Ibid 
45 Lindell, Ulf., Persson, Stefan. 1986. “The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview”. 
Cooperation and Conflict 21: 81.  
46 Ibid: 81-91. 
47 Hans, Vogel. 1983. „Small States’ Efforts in International Relations: Enlarging the Scope“. Small States in 
Europe and Dependence, eds. Otmar Höll. Vienna: Braumüller: 54-68. 
48 Baehr, Peter. 1975. “Small States: A Tool for Analysis?” World Politics 27: 466. 
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borders and the liberalization of movement of goods, services, capital and people all contributed 
to the focus shifting to small states and economic interdependence/development issues49.  
When the 1980s saw a decline of small state scholarship and the focus turning to economic 
issues, the 1990s marked the renaissance of small state studies. This was due to the rather 
sudden (re)emergence of small states in Central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the 
USSR. Changes in IR theory itself and the popularity of social constructivism with its focus on 
norms and identity also reinvigorated small state studies during that time50. This period marks 
the shift of interest from generalizable hypothesis to a localized focus on regional trends and 
developments mainly in Europe, but also in other regions (mainly in Africa and Asia). The next 
chapter will pick up where this one ends and examines small state literature in the broadly 
defined academic field of “European studies”. To conclude, table 4, derived from Neumann and 
Gstöhl’s paper Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International Relations (2004), 
summaries the development of small state studies in IR from the 1950s to the post-Cold War 
revival.  
Table 4. Synopsis of small state studies by Neumann and Gstöhl (2004).  
 1950s-1970s: 
heyday 
1980s:  
standstill 
1990s-today: 
revival 
Historical events Cold War conflict, 
proliferation of small 
states through 
decolonization 
Decline of the U.S. 
hegemon and rise of 
global 
interdependence 
End of Cold War, 
globalization and 
regional integration, 
proliferation of small 
states 
Dominant IR 
theory 
Realism/neorealism Neorealism vs. 
neoliberal 
institutionalism 
Rationalism vs social 
constructivism  
Small state topics Definition of small 
states, size and 
foreign policy, 
security issues, small 
and micro-states in 
international 
organizations 
Small states and 
economic 
interdependence, 
development issues. 
Small states in 
European integration 
and in globalization 
processes, ethno-
political conflicts 
Source: Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004: 13. 
                                                          
49 Neumann, B. Iver., Gstöhl, S. 2004: 10-12. 
50 Ibid: 12. 
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1.4 Small state literature in EU Studies  
The aim of this chapter is to highlight how small states in Europe have been studied. The aim 
is to present the core themes and not to discuss in length the empirical results of each study. 
Carlsnaes (2007) suggests that “the modern analysis of the international relations of small 
European states was established by Annette Baker Fox in her landmark book on The Power of 
Small States, published in 1959, where she inquired into how the governments of small states 
(such as Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Ireland and Portugal) avoided being drawn into 
the Second World War, while other similarly small and weak states failed to do so51. The end 
of the Cold War and the (re)emergence of several small states in Central and Eastern Europe 
prompted a revival of small state studies52. This scholarship was reinvigorated by scholars 
asking questions such as: what is a small state in the EU? How can we explain the behavior of 
small EU member states? How much influence do small states have on EU policy? The focus 
was also on “identifying the often particular and unconventional sources of small states’ foreign 
policy power53.  
This renewed interest produced scholarly research that can be classified under the rather broad 
academic field of “European studies” (also “EU studies” or “European integration studies”, but 
in order to simplify things, I’m only using “EU studies” as an umbrella term). As noted above, 
the steady decline of interest in small states and their role in the international system in IR 
coincided with the rapidly growing interest in small states in Europe. This process was due to 
several reasons: first, in the 1990s, many small states (re)emerge after the end of the Cold War 
and the dissolution of the USSR; second, the rapidly increasing pace of European integration 
and the 1995 enlargement round which saw Sweden, Finland and Austria join the EU; third, in 
the 2000s, the 2004 Eastern enlargement with Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta joining the ranks. We can broadly 
categorize the different periods into three distinct eras in EU studies – the 1990s revival, the 
2000s “golden age” and the 2010s to present. Table 5 sums up the noteworthy historical events 
and topics that were popular in the given era.  
                                                          
51 Carlsnaes, Walter. 2007. „How Should we Study the Foreign Policies of Small European States?“ Outono-
Inverno 118: 8.  
52 Goetschel, Laurent, eds. 1998. Small States inside and outside the European Union: Interests and Policies. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 9.  
53 Chong, Alan., Maass, Matthias. 2010. “Introduction: the foreign policy power of small states”. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 23: 381.  
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Table 5. Synopsis of small state literature in EU studies.  
 1990s: the revival 2000s: the golden 
age 
2010s-present 
Noteworthy 
historical events 
Fall of the USSR; 
1995 enlargement. 
2004 and 2007 
“Eastern” 
enlargement; onset 
of the global 
financial crisis 
Eurozone crisis; full 
onset of the Treaty 
of Lisbon.  
Popular small state 
topics 
Processes of 
integration; rising 
interdependence; rise 
of studies examining 
one specific policy 
area and small state 
influence; single 
country studies. 
Europeanization of 
new member states 
domestic politics; 
role and influence of 
(new) small member 
states in the EU; 
security challenges 
of small EU states 
Institutional changes 
and small states 
ability to influence. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
In the 1990s, after the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, scholarship on small states 
in the EU mostly focused on integration, interdependence and small state influence on certain 
EU policy areas. For example, Goetschel’s (1998) “Small States Inside and Outside the 
European Union” examines the “relationship between European states both inside and outside 
the EU” and the “consequence of these developments on the foreign and security policy of small 
states54”. Another influential work from on how small states influence EU politics (Common 
Agricultural Policy or CAP) was Baldur Thorhallsson’s (2000) “The Role of Small States in the 
European Union”. The book looks at the “role of smaller states, deals with the important criteria 
of distribution and redistribution of EU budgetary expenditures in the key areas of agriculture 
and structural funds and explains how smaller states promote their interest more effectively 
than larger states55” .  
When the 1990s saw scholarly interest return to small state topics in Europe, the 2000s can be 
considered a truly “golden age” for small EU state studies. The Eastern enlargement in 2004 
and 2007 saw numerous small states join the EU and a shuffling of balance of power inside the 
EU institutions. This period is characterized not only by scholarship that continued exploring 
the role and influence the new small member states had in the now expanded EU, but also an 
impressive body of literature on “Europeanisation” emerged. Archer and Nugent’s (2002) 
                                                          
54 Goetschel, Laurent, eds. 1998: 1. 
55 Thorhallsson, Baldur. 2000. The Role of Small States in the European Union. Farmham: Ashgate: 1.  
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article “Small States and the European Union” explores the “distinctive contributions small 
states have made to the evolution of the European integration process and the nature and 
operation of the European Union56”. Their research is historical in nature and does not yet 
include the states that joined in 2004.  
Scholarship that focused on the new small member states and their role and influence in the EU 
gained in popularity in the second half of the decade. Panke’s (2008) analysis of small state 
influence in EU explores the “strategic advantages and disadvantages of smaller states in the 
EU and comprehensively maps their strategies to counterbalance them57”. Overall, her research 
found that small states can effectively counterbalance “size related disadvantages a great deal 
(albeit with inter-state variation) and [to an extent] shape EU policies according to their 
interests58”. Avery, Faber and Schmidt’s (2009) study on the effects of the EU on the new 
member states also belongs in this category. Their study looks at how accession has affected a 
selected few new small member states. The Nordic countries were also enjoying the spotlight. 
For example, Jakobsen (2009) has argued that “the Nordic countries have had a significant, and 
at times even decisive, influence upon the Common Security and Defense Policy59”.  
It can be argued that EU studies has not been able to produce much generalizable knowledge 
about small member state behavior in the EU60. It is therefore understandable that scholars 
focused their attention on specific policy areas. This thesis also aims to situate itself in this 
category of research. It seeks to explain and determine the extent small member states have had 
on one key EU policy area – the Eastern Partnership initiative. In order to do so, I employ the 
use of three case studies in order to compare the EU Council presidency periods of Latvia and 
Lithuania with that of Poland’s. The reason for committing to this kind of research is simple – 
studies that focus on small member state influence on EU foreign policy have been few and far 
between. Nasra’s (2008; 2010) research has contributed to this task by looking at Belgium and 
Greece, but overall scholarship on this topic has been scarce.  
One area of research that also gained popularity in the 2000s was studies that focused on the 
process of “Europeanisation” and norms in general. For example, Annica (2002) looks at how 
                                                          
56 Archer, Clive., Nugent, Neill. 2002: 1.  
57 Panke, Diana. 2008: 1.  
58 Ibid: 26.  
59 Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 2009. “Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian 
EDSP”. Journal of Common Market Studies 47: 81.  
60 Nasra, Skander. 2011. „Governance in EU foreign policy: exploring small state influence“. Journal of European 
Public Policy 18: 165. 
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small states have influenced the normative environment of the EU and draws from Sweden’s 
participation in the field of environmental politics61, while Björkdahl (2008) explores norm 
advocacy as a way to explain small member states influence in the EU by “tracking the process 
of Swedish promotion of conflict prevention”62. The newly emerged body of literature on 
Europeanisation studied the “European integration and its impact on domestic policies, politics 
and polities” and “whether domestic institutions may also be subjected to change, and whether 
European legislation affects domestic policy making63” (see also Héritier et al. 2001; Thatcher 
2004; Falkner et al 2005; Schmidt 2006). The reason for this sudden burst of popularity can be 
attributed to the newly joined small states. Many of these fresh member states were undergoing 
fundamental changes and kind of scholarship focused predominantly on “positive integration 
such as environmental policies64”.  
The start of a new decade signaled a declining interest in the study of small member states. Two 
reasons may explain this: first, the onset of the global financial crisis in the second half of the 
decade threw the EU (and the Eurozone) into a financial crisis; second, the Europeanisation 
process in states that had joined in 2004 was coming to an end and a period of domestic political 
“normalization” had begun. Because of this, no single topic can be said to dominate from 2010 
onward. The full onset of the Treat of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, 
posed limitation on the Council presidency and saw the foreign policy agenda-setting 
competencies granted to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. Recent studies, such as Steinmetz and Wivel’s (2010) “Small States in Europe”, mostly 
concentrate on the institutional changes within the European Union and its effects on small 
states in the EU65. Also, Szabó (2011) has looked at how the Lisbon Treaty has affected and re-
structured the role of the rotating presidency66. This thesis continues in this tradition and focuses 
on small member states ability to influence EU foreign policy (through the Eastern Partnership 
initiative) in the new post-Lisbon institutional environment.  
                                                          
61 Kronsell, Annica. 2002. “Can Small States Influence EU Norms? Insights From Sweden’s Participation in the 
Field of Environmental Politics”. Scandinavian Studies 74.  
62 Björkdahl, Annika. 2008. “Norm advocacy: a small state strategy to influence the EU?” Journal of European 
Public Policy 15: 135.  
63 Fontana, Marie-Christine. 2009. “Small States inside the outside the EU: Europeanisation and domestic policy 
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64 Ibid 
65 Steinmetz, Robert., Wivel, Anders. 2010: 1.  
66 Szabó, Erika Márta. 2011. “Background Vocals: What Role for the Rotating Presidency in the EU’s External 
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To conclude this chapter, the study of small member states and their role, influence and behavior 
in the EU can be divided into three distinct periods: first, period of revival in the 1990s where 
the focus was primarily on the processes of integration amid rising interdependence; second, a 
“golden” period of 2000s, where scholars focused on Europeanisation processes and the 
influence of (new) member states in the EU; and third, the period from 2010 and onward saw a 
relative decline of the field, but popular topics included institutional changes and its effects on 
small member states ability to influence processes in the EU. The final part of this chapter 
discusses the ways one can explain small member state influence in the context of the EU.  
 
1.5 Sources of small member state influence in EU foreign policy 
The aim of this subchapter is to present the factors through which one can explain small member 
state influence in the context of the EU. In order to construct a working framework that can 
adequately explain small member state influence, I draw from various authors and their 
contributions to the discussion.  
Realist scholarship argues that EU foreign policy is dominated by big member states and for 
“states with a limited material resource base, there is not much choice other than to accept the 
authority of large member states67”. For example, Gegout (2002) has argued that big member 
states, such as France, the UK, Germany and Italy, are at the heart of EU’s foreign policy 
decision-making process68. Because big member states have more capabilities, they are more 
likely to dominate over smaller members and override their interests. On the other hand, various 
authors (see Nasra 2011; Jakobsen 2009; Pastore 2013; Björkdahl 2007; Grøn and Wivel 2011; 
Panke 2008) have argued that small member states can, under specific circumstances, 
successfully affect EU policy. The analytical framework of this thesis consists of three factors 
that can adequately explain the sources of small member state influence in EU foreign policy 
and are summed up in table 6.  
 
 
                                                          
67 Nasra, Skander. 2011: 165.  
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Table 6. Sources of small member state influence. 
Factor Description 
Commitment Commitment to an issue; general salience of 
a policy issue.  
Immaterial resources Forerunner reputation; expertise in a policy 
area; possession of content and procedural 
knowledge. 
Institutional setting Using the rotating Council Presidency to 
one’s own advantage. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Although discourse on small member state influence has produced several explanatory factors, 
I only discuss the most relevant to the topic at hand. As Archer and Nugent (2002) explain, 
“there is no shortage of hypotheses to be tested about the small member states of the EU and 
their behavior69”. Jakobsen (2009) has pointed out that different scholars have referenced 
different factors in their studies and that there is no single golden source of influence that small 
member states may utilize (see Honkanen 2002; Wallace 2005)70.  
My goal is not to identify as many sources of influence as possible, but rather to explain it as 
parsimoniously as possible. Therefore I have identified only those factors that can be 
empirically utilized. The idea is not to draw general conclusions, but to use existing theory that 
can adequately explain small member state influence. Taken together the three factors discussed 
form the theoretical framework of this thesis: first, small member states must be committed to 
an issue - it must be of general importance to them; second, they must possess immaterial 
resources, such as general expertise or they be recognized as leaders in the issue area; and third, 
small member states are more influential when they use the EU’s institutional setting (such as 
the Council Presidency seat) to their advantage.  
Commitment  
Two elements “determine a state’s commitment: the relative salience of an issue and a state’s 
dependence on the EU to achieve its policy objectives71”. The relative salience of an issue is 
defined as “the extent to which an actor will put into effect its potential to influence other actors 
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71 Nasra, Skander. 2011: 167. 
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and the decision outcome72”. The logic here is that “those states that attach higher levels of 
salience to a policy issue are likely to display higher levels of activity, strengthening their 
position in the policy process” even vis-à-vis large states73. Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) 
argue that if large states tend to be proactive in all policy areas, then small states have to 
prioritize “between EU policy areas, as well as within particular policy areas, in order to have 
necessary “administrative force” to press for their interests”74. This rings especially true in the 
two cases under examination here – as I will demonstrate later, Latvia and Lithuania prioritized 
the Eastern Partnership initiative during their presidency of the Council of the EU period. The 
Eastern Partnership in turn is a policy area within the overarching EU foreign policy area.  
Immaterial resources 
Realist scholars assume that “the ability of a state to successfully influence is proportional to 
its underlying power, which is defined in terms of its access to exogenously varying material 
resources75”. On the other hand, Nasra (2011) argues that immaterial resources, such as a 
forerunner reputation, expertise in a policy area and possession of content and procedural 
knowledge are a source of influence as much as material resources76. A forerunner reputation 
refers to the reputation a state has among other members of the international family. A 
forerunner reputation can be earned by being an expert in a specific policy area - a good example 
is Estonia and its reputation as a forerunner in all things cyber and e-governance77. If we define 
state “smallness” as a social construct and not “a static feature in time and space78” then states 
can be “small” and “big” in different fields. Estonia can be “big” in cyber issues and digital 
governance but “small” in other issues. Reputation can help small states mitigate their perceived 
smallness and a good reputation build trust, making it easier for small states to bargain with 
other actors. The same goes for expert knowledge about the EaP and the “Eastern” region in 
general. Jakobsen (2009) argues that “such as reputation has been found to be of particular 
importance for small states lacking the authority that comes with great power status79”. Theories 
of communicative action also talk about relevant knowledge that can be used to exert influence. 
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Nasra (2011) refers to Ulbert and Risse (2005) who talk about how actors with relevant 
knowledge become key players “in a context that is densely institutionalized and based on non-
hierarchical relations, especially when the institutional process is depoliticized, i.e., when the 
main actors lack knowledge and are uncertain about their preferences, such “knowledge 
brokers” [see also “norm entrepreneur”] are empowered and may find a window of opportunity 
to exert influence80”. 
Institutional setting 
Small member states can use the institutional setting of the EU to their advantage. The EU 
structure can help small states exert more influence than they would normally be able to81. The 
rotating presidency of the Council of the EU is one such example of how the EU structure 
assists small states by unlocking “incompatible negotiating positions and secure efficient 
agreements, while simultaneously allowing the government in office to shape distributional 
outcomes82”. In effect, the Council Presidency grants the seat holding government a power 
position, enabling the state to influence policy through agenda shaping. Although the Lisbon 
treaty made several changes to the role and function of the Council Presidency institution, such 
as narrowing down the agenda-shaping capacity, “the rotating Presidency is still in charge of 
certain meetings and can still exert its influence on the agenda via its chairing position83”. 
According to Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg (2004), the “Presidency can be translated into 
normative power through the opportunity to launch and promote novel policy ideas and 
ideational frameworks and can thus be claimed to be a tool especially well-suited to small states 
which lack traditional power resources84”.  
I also assume that small member states gain more leverage by relying on soft bargaining 
strategies and “persuasion rather than coercion to be a characteristic” strategy of small member 
state Council Presidencies85. Grøn and Wivel (2011) argue further that in order for small 
member states to take full advantage from the Presidency, they must act as “smart states”: first, 
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84 Bengtsoon, Rikard., Elgström, Ole., Tallberg, Jonas. 2004. “Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union 
Presidency and the Nordic Countries”. Scandinavian Political Studies 27: 314. 
85 Grøn, Caroline. H., Wivel, Anders. 2011. „Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy“. Journal of European Integration 33: 525. 
26 
 
they must focus their limited resources and concentrate only on issues of high importance; 
second, small member states must look after the interests of the EU as a whole and not focus 
on their narrow national interests86.  
To conclude, the three factors do not exclude the possibility that additional sources of influence 
can be detected. Commitment to an policy issue, immaterial resources and the ability to use the 
EU’s institutional setting to one’s own advantage all contribute to small member state’s ability 
to influence EU foreign policy, but many not be suitable in other policy contexts. Influence is 
a tricky concept. The next methodology chapter will discuss just how difficult “measuring” 
influence in the post-Lisbon context can be. The aim is not only to discuss, but to also synthesize 
a novel influence measuring framework. The third and final chapter will then test this new 
framework on three cases – the Council presidencies of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  
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2. RESEARCH METHOD   
This chapter specifies the research method used in this thesis. The chapter is divided into four 
sections – the first subchapter explains the logic behind small-N research design; the second 
focuses on case selection and the data used; the third subchapter presents the hypothesis to be 
tested; the fourth subchapter discusses different influence “measuring” frameworks and 
presents the method used in this thesis.   
 
2.1 Small-N research design and its drawbacks 
The aim of this thesis is simple enough – to investigate the extent small member states, such as 
Latvia and Lithuania, have been able to influence EU foreign policy using the Eastern 
Partnership initiative as an overarching case study. Within this case study, three sub-case 
studies can be found – the Council Presidencies of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In the previous 
chapter, Latvia and Lithuania were conceptualized as “small states” and Poland as a “big state”. 
Hence, the Polish case is used for comparison purposes because, as I explain later, all three 
countries identified the EaP as a key priority during their respective presidency periods. The 
way I employ these three case studies does not imply that my goal is to generate generalizable 
knowledge about small state behavior. Implying that generalizable knowledge claims can be 
made about the world “out there” would mean that these three case studies make the ontological 
assumption that “there are recognizable regularities and a recognizable order in the world87”. 
In a sense, a rigid (“scientific”) causal explanation is not what I aim to achieve with this thesis.  
Instead I assume a qualitative approach and argue that although influence is possible and 
“measurable” to an extent, the explanations for it depend on institutional settings and may vary 
from EU policy area to policy area. From an epistemological point of view, I presume that 
“some phenomena are not governed by causal laws but, at best, by probabilistic ones88. Here I 
agree with constructivism and with Kratochwil (2008), who explains that “theories are not 
descriptions to be evaluated by their literal correspondence to some discoverable reality, but 
partial ways of understanding the world, which should be compared with each other for their 
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explanatory power89”. In short, this thesis is case oriented – it aims at “rich descriptions of a 
few instances of a certain phenomenon90”.  
The aim here is to study the effect small member states can have on one EU policy area – its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Following a probabilistic logic, one can argue 
that the probability of influencing EU foreign policy is higher when small member states: 1) 
fully commit themselves to a policy area that they consider to be important; 2) possess certain 
immaterial resources (such as expertise in the policy area); 3) use the EU structure (such as the 
Presidency of the Council of the EU) to their advantage. In light of this, a small-N (one to few 
cases) research design is an obvious choice here because of the number of cases under 
investigation in this thesis. A large-N design would entail a statistical analysis of many cases 
with the goal of making generalizable inferences. As Porta (2008) mentions, the “case-oriented 
strategy focuses upon a relatively small number of cases, analyzed with attention to each case 
as an interpretable whole, seeking to understand a complex unity rather than establish 
relationships between variables” and that “in contrast, case-based logic tends to explore 
diversity (and deviant cases) by thick description of one or small number of cases, often 
contrasted on several dimensions91”. Two developments limit the number of cases that could 
be investigated in light of the goals set out in this thesis: one, the amount of data available (more 
on this in the next subchapter); and two, the number of member states that have proclaimed the 
Eastern Partnership as a top priority in their time as Council presidents. This makes it hard to 
(at least for now) conduct a large-N (statistical) analysis of small member state influence on 
certain kind of foreign policy initiatives.  
The “drawbacks” of using the small-N research design is that instead of aiming at generalizable 
knowledge and statistical correlation, it focuses on uncovering complexities within cases and 
concrete knowledge about specific processes92. What does this mean for the study of small 
member state influence in EU? Although no generalizable statements can be made, focusing on 
certain EU policy priorities (such as the Eastern Partnership initiative), one can test context 
specific hypothesis that do not aim at universality.  
                                                          
89 Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2008. “Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters”. Approaches and 
Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, eds. Donatella della Porta, Michael Keating. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 80-99. 
90 Porta, Donatella della. 2008. “Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented research”. 
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, eds. Donatella della Porta, 
Michael Keating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 198.  
91 Ibid: 204-207. 
92 Ibid: 203. 
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2.2 Selection of cases and data 
This subchapter discusses the logic behind case and data selection. In order to draw any kind 
of inferences, comparison as an analytical tool must be utilized. As Landman (2008) notes, 
cases in a small-N study have to be “intentionally selected and [the sample size has to be] 
significantly smaller than a global selection93”. Two factors limit the number of cases available 
to investigate: first, the limited amount of member states that have prioritized one certain policy 
initiative (the Eastern Partnership in this case); and second, the availability of analyzable data. 
If in large-N variable oriented studies, “methods of sample selection are usually constrained by 
statistical rules”, then case-oriented research usually “focuses particularly on positive cases, 
that is cases where a phenomena (such as member states that focus on the EaP during their 
Council presidencies) is present94”. Gerring (2001), among other things, also refers to 
comparability when he talks about case selection based on similarity among cases on some 
relevant issues95”.  
As noted in the last subchapter, the three cases “revolve” around one “mother” case – the 
Eastern Partnership initiative. The main disadvantage with this setup is that the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis might not replicable outside this restricted area, as the Eastern Partnership 
is just one of EU’s foreign policy initiatives. As Porta (2008) finds, this disadvantage means 
that when we compare cases within similar systems, “we cannot go beyond so-called middle-
range theories – theories that apply only in a restricted area96”. The availability of data also 
limits the number of cases that are available to investigate in this context. As a qualitative study, 
no statistical data will be collected or used. Instead I rely on a variety of secondary sources, 
progress reports, presidency programs, joint declarations, archival data, policy papers, 
speeches, official documents and news articles. These sources are then used to determine the 
levels of goal achievement and ascription in both the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the 
Eastern Partnership. The next subchapter will discuss the research questions and main 
hypothesis to be tested in this thesis.  
 
                                                          
93 Landman, Todd. 2008. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. London and New York: 
Routledge: 68. 
94 Porta, Donatella della. 2008: 212.  
95 Gerring, John. 2001. Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 164. 
96 Porta, Donatella della. 2008: 214. 
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2.3 Competing hypothesis on small member state influence 
This thesis is driven by four research questions. First, can small EU member states influence 
EU foreign policy? Second, how can we explain their potential influence? Third, how can we 
“measure” influence? And fourth, how much influence have they actually exerted? Obviously 
this thesis would be very short if the answer to the first question is a clear “no”. Instead, as I’ve 
already discussed in the last chapter, small member states have a higher probability of 
influencing EU foreign policy if they a) show commitment and prioritize a certain issue area 
(such as the Eastern Partnership imitative); b) they possess certain immaterial resources, like a 
forerunner reputation or expertise in a certain issue area; and c) they use the EU’s institutional 
setup to their advantage (utilizing the Council Presidency for example).  
Turning now to the other two questions – the “measuring” mechanism and the amount of 
influence small member states actually exert. How can one determine the amount of influence 
on a case that exhibits all three theoretical prerequisites mentioned above? I propose three sets 
of hypothesis to be tested on the three cases based on the dimensions through which influence 
is measured in this thesis. First, the Eastern Partnership joint initiative has two tracks: the 
bilateral and the multilateral. Vandecasteele et al (2013) find that the Presidency has more 
influence on the bilateral track than the multilateral97. From the small member state angle, we 
can test the following two hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1A: Small states have more influence on the bilateral relations than on multilateral. 
Hypothesis 1B: Small states have more influence on multilateral relationships than on bilateral. 
The second set of hypothesis focuses on goal achievement. As I discuss in the next chapter, 
goal achievement is usually “measured” by comparing outputs (final outcomes) with the inputs 
(agenda). Therefore I propose that:  
Hypothesis 2A: Small member states have more influence on the agenda than on the final 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 2B: Small member states have more influence on the final outcomes than on the 
agenda. 
                                                          
97 Vandecasteele, Bruno., Bossuyt, Fabienne., Orbie, Jan. 2013. „Unpacking the inluence of the Council 
Presidency on European Union external policies: The Polish Council Presidency and the Eastern Partnership“. 
European Integration Online Papers 1: 20. 
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The third indicator I’ll be looking at is the level if ascription - how much of the inputs and 
outputs can actually be ascribed to the presidency and how much to other EU institutions 
involved. The ascription indicator allows me to test the following hypothesis combination: 
Hypothesis 3A: The overall goal achievement level is higher when the level of ascription is 
lower.  
Hypothesis 3B: The overall goal achievement level is higher when the level of ascription is 
higher.  
When goal achievement is high and the level of ascription is low, the presidency’s influence on 
the inputs/outputs equals or exceeds that of other actors. If both goal achievement and the level 
of ascription are high, the presidency’s influence on the inputs/outputs is lower than that of the 
EU institutions. This is explained more in detail below in the final section of this chapter.  
 
2.4 Defining and measuring influence 
The aim of this subchapter is to operationalize “influence”. First, I will discuss previous 
measurement frameworks and second, I will then argue that influence should be determined 
through two core factors – goal achievement and the level of ascription. In short, my research 
focuses on actions taken by the three actors during their Council Presidency periods and their 
influence on both the input (agenda-setting) and the output (final outcomes) across the bilateral 
and the multilateral tracks of the Eastern Partnership initiative. Graph 1 illustrates the exact 
logic behind the framework used in this thesis.   
Measuring “influence” is related to the classical problem of measuring “power98”. According 
to Baldwin (2013), it is “often useful to distinguish among such power terms as power, 
influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement and so 
on99. Dahl’s (1957) classical definition of power is: “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do100”. But power is “not always 
converted into influence and, alternatively, actors may exert influence even without being 
powerful101”. We may “infer the political power of an actor from his political influence, the 
                                                          
98 Lindell, Ulf., Persson, Stefan. 1986: 80. 
99 Baldwin, David. A. 2013. “Power and International Relations”. Handbook of International Relations, eds. 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publication.  
100 Dahl, Robert. A. 1957. “The Concept of Power”. Behavioral Science 2: 202-203.  
101 Vandecasteele, Bruno., Bossuyt, Fabienne., Orbie, Jan. 2013: 5 
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former being a kind of generalization of the other102”. Indeed, as Cox and Jacobsen (1973) note: 
“influence is to be distinguished from power – power means capability; it is the aggregate of 
political resources that are available to an actor and may be converted into influence, but it is 
not necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent103”. Instead of focusing on small member 
states power over something or somebody, I use Bunse’s (2009) conceptualization and define 
influence as “intentionally changing an outcome from what it would have been in the absence 
of an action104”. In the context of this study, influence is thus a process by which small member 
states intentionally change the outcome of a policy (in this case, the Eastern Partnership 
initiative).  
Graph 1. Flowchart illustrating the research framework employed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Several authors have written on the political influence assessment topic (see Banfield 1961; 
Arts and Verschuren 1999; Vandecasteele, Bossuyt and Fabienne 2013). As is to be expected, 
measuring influence proves to be tricky. The problem lies in the non-quantifiable nature of 
influence itself as “there is no quantitative tool that can adequately capture performance in 
foreign policy as in economic policy or social policy (like unemployment rate, crime rate, 
                                                          
102 Arts, Bas., Verschuren, Piet. 1999. „Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-making: An Instrument 
Based on Triangulation“. International Political Science Review 20: 412. 
103 Cox, Robert., Jacobson K. Harold. 1973. The Anatomy of Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press: 3. 
104. Bunse, Simone. 2009. Small States and EU Governance: Leadership through the Council Presidency. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan: 5. 
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pollution levels, etc.)105”. Majority of the studies that grade influence do it by looking at how 
policy inputs (or the agenda) match up against the outcomes. For example, the European 
Foreign Policy Scorecard evaluates Europe’s external relations performance by comparing 
between European foreign policy objectives and the outcomes106. Weisensee (2010) employs a 
similar input vs. output framework in his analysis of EU foreign policy impact on the Georgian 
crisis of 2008. His framework “provides a four-category system (nil, marginal, considerable 
and significant political impact) in order to determine the effectiveness of European foreign 
policy impact and allows [me] to classify each single foreign policy action accordingly107”.  
Arts and Verschuren (1999) on the other hand construct an elaborate method of their own – the 
three dimensional EAR instrument. The EAR method consist of: 1) the ego-perception 
dimension which “views key players with regard to their own influence (or its lack) on key 
topics in complex decision-making; 2) the alter-perception, focusing on “views of the other 
players with regard to the influence (or its lack) of “ego” on key topics in complex decision-
making; 3) researcher’s own analysis that acts as a “validity check of ego- and alter-perceptions 
by the researcher on the basis of the indicators “goal-achievement”, “intervention”, and 
“anticipation”108. In short, they combine “goal-achievement” with expert interviews with key 
players both inside and outside of the decision-making framework. The EAR method is also 
utilized by Vandecasteele (2013) in his own study of the Council Presidency as an institutional 
facilitator for political influence. In addition to expert interviews, he uses three indicators, 
measured on an interval scale, in order to assess the presidency’s political influence: 1) goal 
achievement; 2) ascription of goal achievement (the extent to which goal achievement can be 
ascribed to the presidency); 3) and political relevance (how politically (un-)important the final 
output was)109”.  
The framework used in this thesis uses a modified version of Vandecasteele’s (2014) 
framework, but omits the “political relevance” indicator, as it’s not essential to this study. I also 
divide the “level of ascription” indicator into two: ascription of agenda-setting and final 
outcomes. This allows me to assess the “beginning” and the “end” of a policy process separately 
                                                          
105 European Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. “Methodology”. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015. 
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2015/extras/methodology 
106 Ibid 
107 Weisensee, Jan. 2010. „Measring European Foreign Policy Impact: The EU and the Georgia Crisis of 2008“. 
EU Diplomacy Papers 9: 7. 
108 Arts, Bas., Verschuren, Piet. 1999: 417. 
109 Vandecasteele, Bruno. 2014. “Influence of the Lithuanian presidency of the EU Council on EU Relations with 
countries of the Eastern Partnership”. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 31: 40-41. 
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and give a more nuanced answer as to who actually influenced the initiative. As illustrated in 
graph 1, I assess influence on both the bilateral and the multilateral tracks of the Eastern 
Partnership. The bilateral track refers to the individual deepening of relations between the six 
partner countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the EU. 
It “supports political and socio-economic reforms in partner countries in order to: 1) foster 
political association and further economic integration with the EU; 2) enhance sector 
cooperation; 3) support mobility of citizens and visa-free travel as long-term goal110”. The 
bilateral track is “underpinned by a multilateral framework that enables to organize regular 
panel meetings, seminars and training programs for all the partner countries together and consist 
of four platforms: 1) democracy, good governance and stability; 2) economic integration and 
convergence with EU policies; 3) energy security; 4) contacts between people111”. I will assess 
the policy influence of each case on both the bilateral relations with the six partner countries 
and on the four multilateral platforms.  
Two main indicators will be used to assess each presidency’s political influence – goal 
achievement and the level of ascription. The operationalization of the indicators is shown in 
Table 7. First, goal achievement (GA) refers to the extent to which the presidency’s goals were 
achieved. This is measured by comparing the inputs with outputs. While Vandecasteele et al 
(2014) use four thresholds (on an interval scale from 0 to 3), I employ three for the sake of 
parsimony: when no goals were achieved, the level of GA is “none”; when the output only 
partially contradicts the goals, the level of GA is limited to moderate; and when the output does 
not contradict the presidency’s goals, the level of GA is considerable to high.  
The second indicator is the level of ascription – how much of the inputs and outputs can actually 
be ascribed to the presidency and how much to other actors (EU institutions) involved. A low 
level of ascription means that the member state had little to no influence on the input 
(agenda)/output (outcome); a limited to moderate level of ascription implies moderate 
influence; a high level of ascription means that the institutions had little to no influence on the 
input (agenda)/output (outcome). In comparison with Vandecasteele’s et al (2014) framework, 
I have changed the method in a way that allows me to assess the level of ascription in the 
agenda-setting phase and on the final output (final outcome).  
                                                          
110 The European Commission. “Eastern Partnership”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership/index_en.htm 
111 Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership. „Eastern Partnership“. http://eceap.eu/en/eastern-partnership/ 
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Table 7. Indicators for assessing the presidency’s political influence 
Indicator Level Description 
G
o
al
 
A
ch
ie
v
em
en
t 
(G
A
) 
None  The (non-)output entirely contradicts the presidency’s input. 
Limited to 
moderate  
The (non-)output partially contradicts the presidency’s 
input. 
Considerable 
to high  
The (non-)output does not contradict the presidency’s input. 
A
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
A
g
en
d
a 
S
et
ti
n
g
 (
A
S
) 
None The presidency was not involved as a chair, or was involved 
but had no role in developing the input (agenda). 
Limited to 
Moderate 
The presidency was involved as a chair to a limited extent, 
but other actors also played a role in developing the input 
(agenda) 
Considerable 
to high 
The presidency was heavily involved in the agenda-setting 
process (input). 
A
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
F
in
al
 
O
u
tc
o
m
es
 
(A
F
O
) 
None The presidency was not involved as a chair, or was involved 
but did not contribute to the output (final outcome). 
Limited to 
Moderate 
The presidency was involved as a chair to a limited extent, 
but other actors also contributed to the output (final 
outcome). 
Considerable 
to high 
The presidency was heavily involved and it is unlikely the 
final output (outcome) would have been the same if the chair 
would not have been involved.  
Source: Partially based on Vandecasteele et al. 2014: 42-43.  
As not to give a false impression that influence is somehow quantifiable, I refrain from using 
numbers. Defining a single threshold is problematic, as there is no clear line between a 
“moderate” and a “significant” levels of influence. Just like attempting to define small states 
using population size as a metric, there is no obvious answer to this problem. It is important to 
acknowledge and watch out for any personal biases the researcher may have. Any classification 
exercise has to be based on valid and reliable data. Therefore I agree with Arts, and 
Verschuren’s (1999) when they conclude that their method “sticks to the level of informed 
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guesses and may, in some cases, remain more of a guess than an informed conclusion (but this 
is probably a drawback for any method to assess influence or power)112”. 
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3. THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE AND THE COUNCIL 
PRESIDENCIES OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND POLAND 
The aim of the last chapter is to analyze and compare the Council Presidencies of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland using the theoretical and methodological framework discussed in the two 
previous chapters. In order to provide a background for the analysis, the first subchapter will 
discuss the history of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its regional and 
multilateral cooperation initiative – the Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EUROMED) and the Black Sea Synergy initiative. The second subchapter 
explores the commitment to and the general salience of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The third subchapter aims to explain how the post-Lisbon 
Council Presidency has been used as an influence exerting tool by the three cases. In the fourth 
subchapter, I apply the methodological framework and explore the influence extorted by the 
three cases. The results of this exercise will be compared in the fifth and last part of this chapter.  
 
3.1 The European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiative 
The aim here is to provide a layer of depth to this thesis by briefly outlining the history of the 
European Neighborhood Policy and its complementary regional multilateral cooperation 
initiatives, including the Eastern Partnership. I trace the development of the ENP from its 
beginnings in a 2003 European Commission communication to a broad post-Lisbon policy that 
it is today. The ENP is a “chiefly a bilateral policy between the European Union and each 
partner country, but it is complemented by three multilateral cooperation initiatives – Eastern 
Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also the Union for the Mediterranean) and the 
Black Sea Synergy113”. The gravitational pull of the EU means that there are currently 16 ENP 
countries with 12 states participating as fully fledged partners. So far, the Eastern Partnership 
includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. The Union for the 
Mediterranean incudes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority and 
Tunisia. The EU also wanted Russia to be involved with the ENP, but “in subsequent 
negotiations it was decided that a separate policy instrument would be developed to guide 
                                                          
113 European Union External Action Service. “European Neighborhood Policy”. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm 
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Russian-European foreign policy – the EU-Russia strategic partnership114”. The Black Sea 
Synergy is different from the other two initiatives. It is “essentially a regional initiative, open 
to all Black Sea States and has very specific objectives established in three key sectors: 
environment, transport and energy115”. The Black Sea NGO forum was launched in 2008 and 
includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania and 
Russia116. Graph 2 illustrates the distribution of the different ENP initiatives and partners. 
Graph 2. The European Neighborhood Policy and its regional cooperation initiatives. 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Several cross-border neighborhood cooperation policy mechanisms preceded the ENP: 
INTERREG (help facilitate cross-border cooperation within the EU), TACIS (support for 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), MEDA (support cooperation between 
Mediterranean states and the EU), PHARE (support for East European states in the EU 
accession process) and CARDS (support for Balkan countries)117”. One of the reasons that 
prompted the creation of the EAP was the need to mitigate the disorder created by this 
smorgasbord of different cross-border cooperation initiatives. The EAP’s origin can be traced 
to a document released in 2003 titled: “The Wider Europe Neighborhood, A New Framework 
                                                          
114 Wesselink, Edzard., Boschma, Ron. 2012. “Overview of the European Neighborhood Policy: Its History, 
Structure, and Implemented Policy Measure”. Search Working Paper 1: 8-9. 
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116 European External Action Service. “Black Sea Synergy”. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/index_en.htm 
117 Commission of the European Communities. 2004. “Laying down general provisions establishing a European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument”. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”. This communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the Parliament stipulates the relations of the EU with its outer 
borders after the fifth enlargement round, which saw EU’s borders shifted markedly further 
east. This communication announced a “proposal to unify the European Union’s wide range of 
policies towards its neighboring countries” with the goal of “creating a ring of friendly, stable 
and prosperous countries around the European Union in order to guarantee stability along the 
outer borders of the EU118”. The idea was to “rationalize and streamline this complex and 
sometimes overlapping set of programs119”. Two further communications from the Commission 
have set out to revise the ENP – “Strengthening the ENP” (2006) and “A Strong European 
Neighborhood” (2007). The first communication seeks to offer the partner countries “improved 
trade and investment prospects, making people-to-people contacts and legitimate short-term 
travel easier, being more active in addressing frozen conflicts, and opening more possibilities 
to mobilize funding120”. The second communication focuses on economic integration, mobility, 
regional conflicts and political dialogue, sectoral reform and modernization, participation in 
Community programs and financial cooperation121. An additional revitalized carrots-for-reform 
ENP strategy was launched in 2011 which “seeks to strengthen individual and regional 
relationships between the EU and countries in its neighborhood through a “more funds for more 
reform” approach – making more additional funds available, but with more mutual 
accountability122”.  
The ENP’s aim is to create Action Plans (or Association Agendas for Eastern partners) for the 
partner countries which demonstrates “their commitment to democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development with the EU 
supporting these achievement with financial support, economic integration and access to the 
EU markets, easing travel to the EU, and technical and policy support123”. The first Action 
Plans were created in 2004 for Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU/ENP signs two kinds of 
                                                          
118 Wesselink, Edzard., Boschma, Ron. 2012: 6.  
119 Ibid: 8. 
120 Commission of the European Communities. 2006. “On Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy”. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2006) 726.   
121 Commission of the European Communities. 2007. “A Strong European Neighborhood Policy”. 
Communication from the Commission COM(2007) 774.  
122 European Commission press release. 2011. “A New and Ambitions European Neighborhood Policy”. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-643_en.htm?locale=en 
123 European Union External Action Service. “European Neighborhood Policy”. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm 
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agreements with third countries - Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Association 
Agreements. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) were at first meant to 
regulate EU relations with the “New Independent States of Eastern Europe, the Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia124”. The PCA’s were basically a lighter version of the Association 
Agreements which are “all-embracing frameworks [that] intent to establish close economic and 
political cooperation (more than simple cooperation) that in some cases prepare for future 
membership of the EU125”. While the goals of the ENP might seem simple – promote 
democracy, rule of law and structural reforms in partner countries by providing financial 
support and other incentives such as easing of travel restrictions - it has not escaped criticism. 
Some southern member states see the policy as geographically “arbitrary”, as it puts too much 
emphasis on its eastern neighbors, while the members in the east favor the intensification of 
relations with their eastern neighborhood126”. Some critics also argue that although the ENP’s 
methodology is “derived from EU’s enlargement experience, accession is not promised127”.   
The Eastern Partnership, together with the Union for the Mediterranean, is one of the two 
geographically defined ENP policy initiatives that “enables partner countries interested in 
moving towards the EU and increasing political, economic and cultural links to do so128”. Since 
its inauguration, four EaP summits (the highest level meetings within the EaP framework) have 
taken place – Prague on 7 May 2009, Warsaw on 29-30 September 2011, Vilnius on 28-29 
November 2013 and in Riga on 21-22 May 2015. The EaP itself has its roots in a 2008 proposal 
by the Polish and Swedish governments that calls to reinforce the “European offer in the Eastern 
direction and to develop an Eastern Partnership that should be based on, but go beyond the 
current ENP, confirming, on the one hand, the differentiation principle towards the neighbors, 
in line with the ENP, and on the other hand, strengthening horizontal links between these  
neighbors and the EU129” and suggests the creation of a two-track bilateral and multilateral 
policy instrument.  
                                                          
124 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Last updated: 2010.  r17002.  
125 European Union External Action Service. “Association Agreements”. http://eeas.europa.eu/association/ 
126 Lippert, Barbara. 2007. “The EU Neighborhood Policy – Profile, Potential, Perspective”. Intereconomics: 181-
182. 
127 Lehne, Stefan. 2014. “Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy”. Carnegie Europe. 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=54420 
128 Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership. “Eastern Partnership (EaP)”. http://eceap.eu/en/eastern-
partnership/ 
129 Polish-Swedish Proposal. 2008. “Eastern Partnership”. http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/sites/default/files/attachments/Polish-Swedish%20Proposal.pdf 
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Table 8. The Eastern Partnership partner countries and their relationship with the EU. 
Partner country Agreement type 
and year of signing 
Deep and 
Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area 
agreement 
(DCFTA) 
Visa facilitation 
and readmission 
agreements  
Armenia Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreement (signed 
1999). Association 
Agreement 
negotiated but not 
signed.130 
No Visa facilitation and 
readmission 
agreement (entered 
into force 2014) 
Azerbaijan Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreement (signed 
1999)131 
No Visa facilitation and 
readmission 
agreement (2014) 
Belarus Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreement (signed 
1995)132 
No Visa facilitation 
negotiations started 
(2014) 
Georgia Association 
Agreement (signed 
2014)133 
Yes Visa facilitation and 
readmission 
agreement (2011) 
Moldova Association 
Agreement (signed 
2014)134 
Yes Visa facilitation and 
readmission 
agreement (2008) 
Ukraine Association 
Agreement (signed 
2014)135 
Yes Visa facilitation and 
readmission 
agreement (2008) 
Source: Compiled by author. 
The initiative was officially launched the next year at the Prague Summit on May 2009 (the 
Union for the Mediterranean was launched a year before). The joint declaration also established 
the new Association Agreements and with it the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
agreements, “where the positive effects of trade and investment liberalization will be 
                                                          
130 European Union External Action. “EU Relations with Armenia”. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm 
131 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and 
the Republic of Azerbaijan. 1999. 99/614/EC 
132 “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States 
and the Republic of Belarus“. 1995. Agreements and Conventions.  
133 European Union External Action. “EU Relations with Georgia”. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/about/index_en.htm 
134 European Union External Action. “EU Relations with Moldova”. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/moldova/index_en.htm 
135 Union External Action. “EU Relations with Ukraine”. http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/about/index_en.htm 
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strengthened by regulatory approximation leading to convergence with EU laws and 
standards136”. So far, three partner countries have signed an Association Agreement and a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA) – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
Table 8 above specifies the type of agreements and years of signing. It needs to be emphasized 
that the EaP “is a joint policy of the EU and its Eastern Partners, and all parties bear 
responsibility for its implementation with the European Commission and the European External 
Action service being responsible for the EaP from the EU side137”.  
The bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries is supported by the 
Comprehensive Institution Building Program (CIB) through which the EU will develop 
individual programs aimed at improving their “administrative capacity, including through 
training, technical assistance and any appropriate innovative measures138”. The multilateral 
track is “aimed at fostering links among partner countries themselves and will be a forum for 
discussion on further developments of the Eastern Partnership139”. Four platforms are organized 
in this framework: 1) democracy, good governance and stability; 2) economic integration and 
convergence with EU sectoral policies; 3) energy security; 4) contacts with people.  
 
3.2 Commitment to the Eastern Partnership initiative and the immaterial resources 
of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
This subchapter expands on the first two theoretical premises mentioned in the previous 
chapter: 1) that smaller member states who “attach higher levels of salience to a policy issue 
are likely to display higher levels of activity, strengthening their position in the policy 
process140” even vis-à-vis large states; 2) and that immaterial resources, such as a forerunner 
reputation, expertise in a policy area and possession of content and procedural knowledge are 
a source of influence. The aim is to tie these two assumptions with the existing evidence on the 
importance of the EaP for each case and on the immaterial resources that each case “possesses”. 
If one is to agree with a post-positivist ontology, then no state can be said to be in the possession 
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of a certain objective qualities. Instead, qualities are attributed or constructed through “social 
practices which on the one hand shapes social reality and on the other hand is influenced by 
it141”. This is to say that a “forerunner reputation” is something that is socially constructed 
through discourse and is not something that exists objectively or in “reality”. The constructive 
“character of discourse is expressed by its ability to generate the identity of its actors, their 
mutual relations and knowledge about the world142”. My aim is not to conduct a full-blown 
discourse analysis, but to identify each cases commitment to the EaP and the immaterial 
resources they possess by examining official documents and some of the elite discourse.  
Latvia 
Latvia’s presidency, which ran from January to June 2015, had three main priorities: enchanting 
EU’s competitiveness, developing the Digital Single Market and digitalization of the public 
sector, and the European Neighborhood Policy143. The EaP enjoys a high level of attention 
within official presidency program which proclaims that “Latvia will continue strengthening 
the Eastern Partnership as an inclusive platform and promoting a more individual and 
differentiated approach in cooperation with each of the Eastern Partnership countries in 
accordance with their own ambitions144”. Latvia’s commitment to the EaP was further 
elaborated by the president of Latvia Andris Bērziņš at the Eastern Partnership Business Forum 
where he remarks: “Thanks to participation in the European single market, favorable 
geographical location, and accumulated experience, development of cooperation with the 
Eastern Partnership countries is among priorities of Latvia and thus, it is one of the priorities of 
the Latvian Presidency and it will remain such in the future as well145”.  
The prioritization of the “East” by Latvia is nothing new and is usually justified with Latvia’s 
historical affinity for the region and its transition experience from a state-controlled planned 
economy to a democratic capitalist country. Commentators often mention geographical 
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proximity to the “East”, its “strategic location at the crossroads between East and West146” and 
its “geographic location, place in geopolitics and historical memory147” as an asset.  Prior to the 
presidency, Latvia’s foreign minister Edgars Rinkēvičs also emphasized the importance of 
geography and history when he comments that “Latvia has been actively participating in the 
elaboration and implementation of the EaP and due to the geographical closeness and historical 
affinity, cooperation with our Eastern Neighbors is of particular importance for our foreign 
policy148”. The accentuation of “historical affinity”, “regional expertise”, “historical memory” 
and “favorable geographical location” is something that all three cases have in common – they 
all agree that these immaterial resources can be used as an asset in the development of the 
common EU foreign policy.  
Lithuania 
The Lithuanian presidency ran from July to December 2013 and similarly to Latvia, also 
defined three main objectives: enhancing the credibility of the financial sector, economic 
growth through investment into research and technology, and tackling global challenges and 
contributing to a safer neighborhood149. According to the official presidency program, “one of 
the key priorities of the Lithuanian Presidency is the development of EU relations with the 
Eastern Partnership countries and strengthening their political association and economic 
integration with the EU150”. The EaP is also privileged throughout the “preparatory documents 
for the presidency, from the 2011 Seimas resolution on presidency priorities up the final 
program151”. Similarly to Latvia, Lithuania’s solidarity with its Eastern neighbors can be 
attributed to a shared history and their “attitude towards their common neighbor, Russia, and 
Latvia’s and Lithuania’s real desire to help the post-Soviet countries to adopt the European 
values of democracy, rule of law and market economy152”.  
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Another similarity is the usage of the “crossroads between East and West” metaphor. Almost 
immediately after joining the EU in 2004, acting President of Lithuania Arturas Paulauskas 
declared that Lithuania would become the “regional leader” in the newly formed ENP: “Our 
geographical location and experience of living at a crossroads of regions and civilizations opens 
up more probably the first opportunity in history to bridge the East and West and make 
Lithuania a center of gravity in a geographically and culturally diverse region153”. The 
prioritization of the EaP then comes as no surprise when Lithuania has emphasized its 
commitment to the region from the very early stages of the ENP. Vilpišauskas et al (2013) 
argue that EaP is one of the areas “where Lithuania is an EU policy-maker rather than policy-
taker” and where the “country can share its experience with the region in “de-Sovietisation” 
and Europeanization154”. An example of this sentiment was echoed during the Ukrainian 
National Platforms visit to Vilnius with the main goal of initiating a “platform of experience 
sharing between the two countries” in the hopes that “Lithuania’s post-Soviet development is 
able to offer a unique model for social, economic, and political change” in Ukraine155”.  
Poland 
The Polish presidency ran from July to December 2011 and had three pivotal priorities: 1) 
European integration as a source of growth; 2) a secure Europe; 3) and a Europe benefiting 
from openness156”. In accordance with theory, Poland, as a “big” member state, often tended to 
be proactive in many policy areas at the same time whereas Latvia and Lithuania, as small 
member states, tended to prioritize between different EU policies. Although overshadowed by 
Eurozone crisis, the economic crisis in Southern Europe and the events in Northern-Africa, the 
“European context still influenced its course157”. Poland’s wish to prove that it can lead the EU 
in times of crisis was echoed by the President of the European Parliament at that time, Jerzy 
Buzek, when he noted that “Poland is synonymous with positive energy, enthusiasm and faith 
in the future” and that “it is a great asset at the start of the Polish presidency and an important 
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task for Poland to change the mood in the EU158”. The goal was to present Poland as an effective 
leader, rather than just a “good manager159”. Summarizing the presidency, then Polish Prime 
Minister Donald Tusk observed: “although we were a debuting country, or maybe because we 
were, our presidency was the presidency of people committed to perform their tasks, European 
tasks, as well as they could160”. Similarly to Latvia and Lithuania, the EaP was also very high 
on the Polish agenda – as one of the instigators of the initiative, Poland’s commitment and a 
“sense of mission” in the Eastern neighborhood are well known (see Copsey and Pomorska 
2010; Szczepanik 2011). In terms of immaterial resources, Polish discourse offers a somewhat 
different, but still a familiar picture. Lipinski’s (2013) analysis of Polish media discourse during 
the presidency reveals that rather than listing financial resources, commentators emphasized 
Poland’s “national uniqueness” and “national history” as assets that “allow the economically 
weaker Poland to make a valuable offer of a cultural and symbolic rather than financial nature, 
which is typical compensation strategy of peripheral countries with a different economic 
capacity from the center161”. 
To conclude, both Latvia and Lithuania present their post-Soviet development experience as a 
resource third countries can use and benefit from. This ties in with the second theoretical 
premise: states who exhibit expertise in a certain policy area, are more likely to successfully 
influence the policy development process. Latvia and Lithuania have certainly made their 
development assistance towards several of the post-Soviet states one of their main foreign 
policy priorities and as Kesa (2011) concludes, coupled with EU membership, it “certainly 
gives these states the possibility to play a bigger role within the international community, and 
with it, they can ambitiously attempt to obtain the prestigious role of a “bridge” or link between 
Europe and its Eastern neighborhood162”. Poland also listed its “national uniqueness” as a 
strength, but compared to the other two, Poland’s Presidency differed in its overall scope and 
magnitude. 
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3.3 The use of the Council Presidency as a tool to exert influence 
Established with the Rome Treaty in 1957, the six month rotating Council Presidency has two 
official tasks: first, it plans and chairs Council meetings and its preparatory meetings; second, 
it represents the Council in relations with the other EU institutions163. In the previous chapter, 
I argued that small member states can mitigate their “smallness” by effectively using the 
opportunities and benefits of the rotating Council Presidency by harnessing the normative 
power granted by the presidency, relying on soft rather than coercive bargaining strategies, and 
acting as small “smart states”. Indeed, as Grøn and Wivel (2011) argue, in order for small 
member states to take full advantage from the Presidency, they must act as “smart states”: first, 
they must focus their limited resources and concentrate only on issues of high importance; 
second, small member states must look after the interests of the EU as a whole and not only 
focus on their narrow national interests164. This subchapter examines this assumption in light 
of the Council Presidencies of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  
Some scholars argue that the rotating Council Presidency has been made politically irrelevant 
by the Treaty of Lisbon and that the presidencies only have a “marginal influence”  on both 
internal and external EU affairs (see Kaczynski 2011; Renshaw and Wallace 2006;  Vida 2010). 
For example, Kaczynski (2011) argues that before Lisbon, the state holding the presidency 
controlled much of the activity in the Council, but “under the new rules the Council has lost 
political weight and is now balanced in almost all its activities by the European Parliament” 
and that the “European Council has largely overtaken the political clout from the Council 
Presidencies and as it now has its own President, there is no special role left for the rotating 
Presidency165”. Lisbon introduced some key chances to the presidency institution, such as 
granting the foreign policy agenda-setting competencies to the new High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and transferring other presidency competencies 
to the European External Action Services (EEAS). While the presidency still continues on with 
most matters, the High Representative combines the “posts of the Commissioner for External 
Relations and the role of the High Representative, merging the Commission and Council 
expertise on the issue of foreign affairs166”. But some commentators question the notion that 
the Presidency has been left empty handed. Instead, they argue that under certain circumstances, 
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the member states holding the presidency do exert influence (see Thomson 2008; Vandecasteele 
et al 2013; Šešelgytė 2013). Although it is expected that the Presidency suppress its national 
interests for the sake of the interests of the EU and that the “presidency’s main task is to achieve 
decision outcomes on important dossiers and in that process may have to put aside its own 
interests167”, most presidencies do favor certain initiatives over others. As already discussed, 
all three cases, but Latvia and Lithuania especially, focused a high proportion of their limited 
resources on the EaP and doing so, made a conscious decision about the selection of policy 
initiatives they will most likely have the most leverage over. Rather than focusing on a small 
set of prioritized issues like Latvia and Lithuania, the Poland aimed at a more all-in-one 
presidency, as it expressed itself as an “effective leader” of the EU at times of high 
uncertainty168.  
But as Grøn and Wivel (2011) argue, small member states who wish to take full advantage from 
the Presidency, must look after the interests of the EU as a whole. Although it can be argued 
that Latvia and Lithuania did use the presidency as a platform to further their interests in the 
Eastern Neighborhood, broader EU interests were (at least on an officially level) kept in mind.  
For example, if we look at some of the discourse surrounding the presidencies, we find that the 
official program documents (obviously) have no single mention of “national interests” and 
every goal is presented as being in the interest of the EU. This can be attributed to the “trio 
system” which ensures that broader EU interests are kept in mind. The system was introduced 
with the Treaty of Lisbon and “working together closely in groups of three, the trio sets long-
term goals and prepares a common agenda determining the topics and major issues that will be 
addressed by the Council over an 18 month period169”.  
To conclude, despite the Treaty of Lisbon changing the rules of the game by transferring key 
powers to other EU institutions, the Presidency remains an excellent opportunity to promote 
national interests. Member states acting as small “smart states” have in theory a greater chance 
to influence initiatives and further their interests. Both Latvia and Lithuania maintained focus 
on the EaP, but at the same time also kept broader EU interests in mind. The next subchapter 
examines the extent these two small member states influenced the initiative and makes a 
comparison with the Polish presidency in order to assess the validity of the claims made above.  
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3.4 Council Presidency of Poland  
Turning now to the actual extent of influence exerted by the three presidencies, I will assess 
each presidency separately by dividing them into bilateral and multilateral tracks. Each case 
will then produce a final “scorecard” at the end of each subchapter.  
Bilateral track 
The purpose of the bilateral track is to deepen the individual relationships between the six 
partner countries and the EU. The partner countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The track “supports political and socio-economic reforms in 
partner countries in order to: 1) foster political association and further economic integration 
with the EU; 2) enhance sector cooperation; 3) support mobility of citizens and visa-free travel 
as long-term goal170”.  
Armenia 
One of the main goals of the Polish Presidency was to further the mobility between the EaP 
partner countries and the EU with liberalizing the visa policy as one of the key elements. The 
final official report concludes that the Polish Presidency “managed to conduct efficient actions 
at supporting the process of liberalizing the visa regime with non-Member States171”. The 
Council adopted a negotiation mandate on the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with 
Armenia172, but the agreement itself was signed in 2012. What was signed, though, was the 
Mobility Agreement with the purpose of better managing the “legal and labor migration, 
including circular and temporary migration173”. Coupled with the fact that the negotiations for 
an association agreement with Armenia did not move forward, goal achievement (GA) for 
bilateral relations with Armenia was limited. Poland was heavily involved in getting the 
negotiations started on the visa facilitation and readmission agreement, as the preliminary 
agendas were drawn up by the presidency174. Although a political commitment to a solution 
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was already taken at the Prague EaP Summit in May 2009, the Commission finally proposed to 
open the negotiations in September 2011175 (AFO is therefore moderate).  
Azerbaijan 
The extent of the progress made with Azerbaijan is similar to Armenia. The EU began 
negotiation the Association Agreement with Azerbaijan on 2010 but “progress has been stalled, 
not least since negotiations on the establishment of a DCFTA are not possible as Azerbaijan is 
not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)176”. The Council adopted the 
negotiation mandate on agreements with Azerbaijan on visa facilitation and readmission (which 
was signed in 2014) on 19 December with Polish influence on the agenda and outcome the same 
as with Armenia177.  
Belarus 
Because of the undemocratic nature of Belarus, bilateral relationship between the two have been 
difficult and unfruitful. The ratification of an EU-Belarus Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement has been stalled since 1997 “in response to the political situation in the country: the 
violation of electoral standards in Belarus’ presidential elections (especially in 2010) and the 
ensuing crackdown on civil society, political opposition and independent media178”. Although 
it is a member of the EaP, Belarus only participates in the framework of the multilateral track. 
Therefore the level of influence is “none”. Thanks to the “intensive efforts of Poland” to 
continue the “conditional quality of policy towards Belarus”, Polish Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk arranged a meeting between the then President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy and the Belarus opposition179”. Although the meeting does not contribute towards the 
overall goal oriented achievements, it can be considered an instance of Polish normative 
influence and soft bargaining skills.  
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Georgia 
The main goal for the presidency concerning Georgia was to facilitate the initiation of 
analogous DCFTA negotiations180 which the Commission authorized in December 2011181 . 
The negotiations themselves started a year later and were launched in Tbilisi by EU Trade 
Commissioner Karel De Gucht and Georgian Prime Minister Gilauri182. In this sense, the 
presidency met its goal and the negotiations went forward, but the DCFTA was already on the 
agenda together with the Association Agreement. The negotiations on the AA started in July 
2010 and the DCFTA is already “included in this agreement”183. The final outcome can’t be 
attributed to the presidency alone because “on many occasions (for example, starting the free 
trade talks with Georgia), German support was important184. Therefore AS is “none” and AFO 
is limited, while GA is high because the presidency reached its main goal of facilitating the 
initiation of the negotiations.  
Moldova 
Negotiating the Association Agreements with Ukraine and Moldova “remained among the top 
objectives” for the Polish Presidency185, but the AA, including the DCFTA was finally signed 
“in the margins of the EU summit held on 27 June 2014186. The expectations were high but the 
presidency only managed to inaugurate the negotiations (which, granted, was one of its 
goals)187. Goal achievement is therefore limited. The talks on the Association Agreement 
already started on January 2010 with the “agreement also envisaging the creation of a free trade 
area to improve the access of Moldovan goods on the EU market188”. AS is therefore “none”. 
The final outcome (launching the trade negotiations) can be ascribed both to the presidency and 
to the Commission as the “Council authorized the Commission to start the Association 
                                                          
180 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. 2012. Report: Polish Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union: 143. 
181 European Commission. 2011. “Consultation on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas: EU-Georgia / EU-
Moldova / EU-Armenia”. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=162 
182 European Commission press release. “EU and Georgia conclude talks on Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area”. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-721_en.htm 
183 Ibid. 
184 Kaczy nski, Piotr. M. 2012. „General Performance of the Polish Presidency“. Lithuanian Foreign Policy 
Review: 124.  
185 Lehtonen, TIia. “Pro-European Presidency: Poland on the Way to the Club of Heavyweight EU Members”. 
FIIA Briefing Paper 87: 5.  
186 European Union External Action. “EU Relations with Moldova”. http://eeas.europa.eu/moldova/ 
187 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. 2012. „Report: Polish Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union“: 135. 
188 Chican, Maria. 2011. „Moldova and the Eastern Partnership: Much Has Been Achieved, More Is Still to Be 
Done“. Youth Eastern Partnership 10: 6. 
52 
 
Agreement negotiations in 2010” and to launch the trade negotiations when Moldova “fulfills 
a set of key recommendations”189. It is therefore logical to assess that the Commission was 
already heavily involved even before the start of the Polish Presidency. 
Ukraine 
Concerning Ukraine, the expectations were high. Already before the start of the presidency, 
commentators hoped that Poland will strengthen Ukraine’s integration with the EU with Poland 
seeking to accelerate the negotiations on the Association Agreement190. Foreclosing the 
negotiations on the DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine was one of the key strategic goals of 
the presidency in trade relations and was met on December191. The Poles also hoped an 
agreement on the AA, but the subsequent “political and legal action taken by Ukrainian state 
authorities against the leader of Ukrainian opposition Yulia Tymoshenko troubled the 
international public option192” and prolonged the AA negotiations. The AA was finally signed 
in 2014 (GA is therefore limited). Also, the DCFTA was already on the agenda since May 2008 
when “immediately after the accession of Ukraine to the WTO, the European Union and 
Ukraine launched negotiations on the DCFTA, as integral part of the future AA193”. Ascription 
for the agenda is therefore “none”, as the issue was already on the agenda. Although at first 
glance the final outcome (finalizing the negotiations on the DCFTA) was proclaimed as a “one 
of the most important achievements of the Polish Presidency in the Eastern dimension194”, the 
credit must be shared with the Commission, as the negotiations for the DCFTA were already 
ongoing before the presidency. 
Multilateral track 
The purpose of the multilateral track is to organize regular panel meetings, seminars and 
training programs for all the partner countries together and consist of four platforms: 1) 
democracy, good governance and stability; 2) economic integration and convergence with EU 
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policies; 3) energy security; 4) contacts between people195. The main activities undertaken in 
the framework of the multilateral track are listed in the “Joint Declaration of the Eastern 
Partnership Summit” which was hosted on 29-30 September in Warsaw. Officially the events 
taking place under the aegis of the multilateral track are not divided into the four platforms, but 
for the sake of simplicity, I’ll categorize each event into the four platforms based on the theme 
of the event. Since the EaP Summit is one of the core events of the presidency, I’ll assess it 
separately from the four thematic platforms.  
Eastern Partnership Summit 
The heads of state or government and representatives of the partner countries met with the EU 
representatives, heads of state and representatives of EU member states in Warsaw to “renew 
their commitment to the objectives and continued implementation of the Eastern 
Partnership196”. Belarus was notably absent from the summit, as one of the main highlights was 
to be a declaration condemning the widespread violence in Belarus197. In the end, the document 
failed to resonate within post-Soviet states, as it was only signed by the presidents and prime 
ministers of the EU member states198. The overall success of the summit was the rather 
comprehensive Joint Declaration signed by all the participants199, but initially the second 
summit was supposed to be held during the Hungarian Presidency in the first half of 2011. Since 
the only clear addition to the declaration suggested by the presidency was a clause 
“corroborating the intention of a further deepening of integration of partner states with the 
EU200” and since the summit was already supposed to happen during the Hungarian Presidency, 
both AS and AFO remain low.  
Democracy, good governance and stability 
One of the “brainchild” of the presidency was the creation of the European Endowment for 
Democracy, which was to be an “additional instrument in democracy promotion mainly in the 
European neighborhood, and it was an attempt to regain attention and funds for the Eastern 
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196 Council of the European Union. 2011. „Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Warsaw, 29-30 
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neighbors201”. The initiative was heavily promoted by the then Polish minister of foreign affairs 
Radosław Sikorski and “managed to find endorsement for his idea from Catherine Ashton and 
Stefan Füle202” who mentioned the initiative in the joint communication on the changing nature 
of the Neighborhood by the High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the European Commission203. The initiative was presented by Poland204 and 
arguably would not have existed were not for its heavy promotion.  
There were other side events, such as the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for 
the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly and the Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF), but the Polish presidency only supported the 
organization of these events and did not lead in the creation of these institutions. CORLEAP 
was set up by the EU Committee of the Regions205, EuroNest by EU and partner country 
parliamentarians and the European Parliament206, and the EaP CSF by the European 
Commission207. All three indicators are therefore limited.  
Economic integration and convergence with EU policies  
Small and medium-sized enterprises are a “key for a sustainable economic development and 
cooperation in this area aims at applying EU best practices208”. On this note, the founding 
meeting of the Eastern Partnership Business Forum was held on 30 September in Sopot. 
Although the event took place at the same time as the EaP summit, it was organized by the 
Polish association of employers “Lewiathan” in cooperation with Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Business Europe and other organizations209. Although it does take credit for 
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establishing the Forum210, the event itself was only partially organized by the presidency. As 
staging the forum was not explicitly listed as a goal, I refrain from assigning a GA and AS 
score. AFO is limited as the presidency did secure that the event would be hosted during the 
summit and attended by high level government officials from the EU and partner countries211.  
Energy security 
No events took place under the multilateral track and although Ukraine and Moldova joined the 
Energy Community Treaty212, this was not part of the platform. 
Contacts between people 
The fourth and final platform focuses in “particular on students, teachers, researchers, young 
people, artists and cultural professionals213”. Enhancing youth mobility was certainly one of the 
priorities of the presidency and it largely assumed its objectives, “focusing on questions on 
related to mobility and to the Eastern dimension of participation of young people214”. Several 
events were planned and executed (EU Youth Conference, Eastern Dimension of Mobility). 
GA is therefore high, but AS and AFO remain limited because these events were organized in 
collaboration with the European Commission215.  
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Table 9. Polish Council Presidency influence scorecard. 
Bilateral track Multilateral track 
Armenia GA Limited to 
moderate 
EaP 
Summit 
GA Limited to 
moderate 
AS High to 
considerable 
AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Azerbaijan GA Limited to 
moderate 
Democracy, 
good 
governance 
and stability 
 
GA Limited to 
moderate 
AS High to 
considerable 
AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Belarus GA None Economic 
integration 
and 
convergence 
with EU 
policies 
GA - 
AS None AS - 
AFO None AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Georgia GA High to 
considerable 
Energy 
security 
GA - 
AS None AS - 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO - 
Moldova GA Limited to 
moderate 
Contacts 
between 
people 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS None AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Ukraine GA Limited to 
moderate 
AS None 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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3.5 Council Presidency of Lithuania  
The Lithuanian Council Presidency ran from July to December 2013 and just like the Polish 
Presidency, set out to build a “common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and 
increased interactions” between the Eastern neighbors and the EU216 
Bilateral track 
Armenia 
Deepening bilateral trade relations with the EaP partners was one of the key goals of the 
Lithuanian Presidency. This included taking steps “necessary for the immediate establishment 
of a deep and comprehensive free trade area with Armenia before the EaP Summit in 
Vilnius217”.  The presidency also hoped to make “significant progress in negotiation the AA 
and concluding the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Armenia218”. But in an 
announcement that shocked many, Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan announced on the 3 
September that the country will instead join the Russian led Eurasian Customs Union, 
effectively breaking off the free trade agreement negotiations that go hand in hand with the 
AA219. After meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Edward Nalbandian, the 
Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius commented: “we respect Armenia’s 
will, but we must emphasize that the decision to join the Customs Union diminishes Armenia’s 
ambitions of integration in and cooperation with the EU220”. Although this was a major blow 
to the presidency, Armenia and the EU did finish the negotiations on the visa readmission 
agreement221 (GA is therefore limited), but because the negotiations on the visa facilitation 
agreement was started by the Commission already in 2011 and the agreement itself was signed 
on 17 December 2012 under the Cypriot Presidency222, both AS and AFO are “none”.  
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Azerbaijan 
Just like with Armenia, the presidency expected “tangible” progress to be made in negotiating 
the AA and the visa facilitation and readmission agreements223. Half of this goal was achieved 
when Linas Linkevičius, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania acting in his capacity as 
President of the Council of the European Union, Stefan Füle, Commissioner with responsibility 
for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy and Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, signed the agreement in the margins of the EaP Vilnius summit on facilitating 
the issuing of visas224. AS and AFO are “none” because the “political support” for the 
agreements was already there in the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit 
held in 2009225 and the negotiations were conducted by the Commission rather than the 
presidency226.  
Belarus 
Strong political, social and economic ties with Belarus means that Lithuania “clearly declared 
its willingness to strengthen cooperation” and pursue the “resumption of dialogue” between the 
EU and Belarus within the Eastern Partnership context227. Although the presidency did note a 
“enchanted bilateral sectoral dialogues between the EU and Belarus on issues such as economic 
and financial cooperation, the environment and education228”, not much actual progress 
materialized. The presidency did issue a statement on the recent developments in Belarus, 
condemning the ongoing violation of human rights and persecution of opposition activists229.  
Georgia 
The presidency’s clear goal was to finalize and “confirm the conclusion” of the negotiations 
over the AA and the DCFTA with Georgia before the EaP Summit in Vilnius230. This goal was 
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achieved and the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, was initialed at 
the Vilnius Summit (GA is high)231. Although the Commission started negotiating the AA with 
Georgia in July 2010 and negotiations on the DCFTA started in February 2012232, the 
presidency was heavily invested in the final outcome. During the presidency, the Speaker of 
the Lithuanian Seimas, Loreta Graužinienė, met with David Usupashvili, the Chairman of the 
Parliament of Georgia, to discuss the “substantial work in the course of EU integration” and to 
declare that Georgia “is on the right path to the European Union233. The signing of the 
agreements was an important achievement for the presidency234 and although the influence of 
other EU institutions cannot be understated, the presidency did moderately affect the outcome 
because of its heavy involvement.  
Moldova 
Similarly with Armenia and Georgia, Vilnius expected to confirm the conclusion of 
negotiations on the AA, the DCFTA235 and the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP)236. All 
three goals were met (GA is high): the AA and DCFTA agreements were initialed and at its 
final meeting under the Lithuanian Presidency and the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(COREPER II) “agreed to grant the citizens of the Republic of Moldova with visa-free travels 
to the EU237”. As the negotiations on the AA were already ongoing since 2009238 and the visa 
liberalization dialogue opened in June 2010239 (when the Visa Liberalization Action Plan was 
established), influence on the agenda is “none”. Influence on the final outcome is moderate, as 
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it depended on Moldova’s own efforts towards democratic reforms, the European Commission, 
and the continued support and efforts of the presidency240.  
Ukraine 
The events in Ukraine unleased by President Viktor Yanukovych and his decision not to sign 
the AA and the DCFTA agreement with the EU were by far the most dramatic moments of the 
Lithuanian Presidency. The presidency had very high hopes before the EaP Summit in Vilnius 
and signing the association agreement, including the DCFTA, was one of the “key priorities” 
of the Lithuanian Presidency241. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite even claimed that 
“stopping the drift of the proposed Eastern Partnership agreement with Ukraine, as well as 
energy policy, would be the two priorities of her countries EU presidency242”. In the end, despite 
the presidencies heavy involvement and support, Ukraine did not sign the agreement, 
unleashing an internal crisis in Ukraine. The EU and Ukraine did initial a “comprehensive air 
service agreement at the margins of the Eastern Partnership Summit243”, but as this was not 
stated as a goal from the beginning of the presidency, GA remains “none”. AS is also “none”, 
as the AA and DCFTA were already on the agenda before the start of the presidency244.  
Multilateral track 
Eastern Partnership Summit 
Developing, enhancing and strengthening the multilateral track was one of the main goals of 
the Vilnius EaP Summit245. Vilnius expected to “mark progress in political association and 
economic integration with Eastern Partnership countries by finalizing association agreements 
including the establishment of the DCFTA’s and set out new strategic guidelines for the 
implementation of the Eastern Partnership policy246”. In the end, the presidency and the partner 
countries issued a vague joint declaration where they reaffirm the “importance they attach to 
the Eastern Partnership founded on mutual interests and commitments as well as on shared 
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ownership, responsibility, differentiation and mutual accountability247  GA and AFO are 
limited, as progress was made with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, but key goals, 
such as signing the AA with Ukraine, were not achieved. Preparing for the summit, the 
presidency was in “intensive contact with the Commission, Commissioner for Enlargement and 
European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle, and working agreements had been made with Van 
Rompuy’s cabinet248”. AS is therefore also limited. 
Democracy, good governance and stability 
In the framework of the “democracy, good governance and stability” platform, the presidency 
aimed to strengthen the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and “encouraging 
dialogue and practical cooperation with the EU’s Eastern Partners in the field of CSDP249”.  To 
achieve this, Vilnius organized a high-level seminar that brought together “policy-makers from 
EU and Eastern Partnership countries, as well as representatives of the European External 
Action Service, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and experts of non-
governmental organizations250”. The 5th Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on October 4-
5 was also held under the presidency, but this event is not fully linked with the incumbent 
presidency. Because the two events ensured that the goal of encouraging “dialogue and 
cooperation” was met, GA is high. AS is limited because the Civil Forum is a regular event. 
AFO is limited because the presidency was only involved to a limited extent and other actor 
also influenced the final outcome. 
Economic integration and convergence with EU policies 
Just like the Civil Forum, the Eastern Partnership Business Forum and Conference for Local 
and Regional Authorities (CORLEAP) has become an annual event. Although organizing the 
event is mentioned in the official program as a goal, the 2th Business Forum was organized by 
the European Investment Bank in cooperation with the presidency and the Lithuanian 
Confederation of Industrialists251. The presidency did plan and organized a meeting between 
the Ministers of Transport of the EU and Eastern Partnership countries held in Luxemburg in 
October where they endorsed an “indicative map of the Eastern Partnership regional transport 
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network that indicates connections with the trans-European Transport Network and related list 
of projects as first concrete steps in improving transport and logistics connections252”. The 
presidency’s aim was to “upgrade sectoral dialogue with the EaP countries to a permanent high-
level cooperation253”. The outcome of the event was a joint declaration between “Ministers 
responsible for Transport of the EU Member States and Partner countries of the Eastern 
Partnership and representatives of the European Commission254”. Overall, the presidency 
achieved its goals (GA is high), but was involved in a limited manner in the agenda-setting 
phase (AS is limited) and in the final outcomes (AFO is also limited).  
Energy security 
Although (internal EU) energy security was one of the priority areas of the Lithuanian 
Presidency255, no specific EaP related multilateral events took place. Instead, the Vilnius 
Summit join declaration recalled the energy interdependence of the partner countries and 
common interest to strengthen mutual energy security including within the Eastern Partnership” 
and confirmed “their intention to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”256. 
Contacts between people 
During the Lithuanian Presidency, the priority in the youth sector was “young people who are 
not in employment, education or training257”. Lithuania planned to organize the first meeting 
of the Eastern Partnership Youth Forum258, which was held on 9-12 September (GA is high). 
The conference was clearly an important milestone for Vilnius and included several workshops 
and meetings prepared by both “international facilitators nominated from the support structure 
of Structured Dialogue by European youth forum” and “national facilitators selected by the 
presidency”259. The presidency also “prepared a compilation document, based on pan-European 
consultations with young people and results of former EU Youth conferences” and was the 
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“main document to refer to during the workshops of the Conference”260 (AFO is therefore 
moderate). The youth forum was part of the Structured Dialogue process, which “brings 
together young people and policy makers across the European Union” and was established by 
the Council of the EU261 (AS is moderate).  
Table 10. Lithuanian Council Presidency influence scorecard. 
Bilateral track Multilateral track 
Armenia GA Limited to 
moderate 
EaP 
Summit 
GA Limited to 
moderate 
AS None AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO None AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Azerbaijan GA Limited to 
moderate 
Democracy, 
good 
governance 
and stability 
 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS None AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO None AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Belarus GA None Economic 
integration 
and 
convergence 
with EU 
policies 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS - AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO - AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Georgia GA High to 
considerable 
Energy 
security 
GA - 
AS None AS - 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO - 
Moldova GA High to 
considerable 
Contacts 
between 
people 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS None AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Ukraine GA None 
AS None 
AFO None 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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3.6 Council Presidency of Latvia  
The Latvian Presidency of the Council of the EU ran from January – June 2015. After the 
turbulent Lithuanian Presidency and the conflict it sparked in Ukraine, the Latvian foreign 
minister Edgars Rinkēvičs “promised a new orientation for the EaP saying it should not provide 
grounds for further antagonism with Russia” and said that “Latvia would pursue a more 
individual approach to EaP countries”262. 
Bilateral track 
Armenia 
Armenia’s decision to join the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union during the Lithuanian 
Presidency effectively meant Armenia’s exclusion from the possibility of signing the AA and 
the DCFTA with the EU. Instead, Riga sought to find new ways to promote dialogue and 
cooperation between Armenia and the EU. Before the start of the presidency, Latvian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvič made a working visit to Armenia to meet Armenian 
president Serzh Sargsyan, National Assembly president Galust Sahakyan and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian to introduce the presidency’s plans and to reaffirm that the 
“preparation of a new cooperation treaty between the EU and Armenia is a priority on the EU-
Armenia agenda263”. The main goal for Riga was to chair the EU-Armenia Cooperation Council 
that was held on 20 January 2015 in Brussels264 (GA is high, but AS is limited because the 
Commission was also involved265). Although the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs Edgars 
Rinkēvičs chaired the Cooperation Council on behalf of High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, no tangible results came out 
of the Cooperation Council (AFO is “none”) and both sides only promised to “examine which 
areas of potential bilateral cooperation are compatible with Armenia’s participation in the 
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Eurasian Economic Union and addressed the possible legal basis for future EU-Armenia 
contractual relations266”.  
Azerbaijan 
Although Azerbaijan is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the presidency did not 
set any concrete goals or achieve any tangible bilateral results with Azerbaijan even though 
cooperation with Azerbaijan was (at least according to Azerbaijan) “among high priorities 
define during Latvian presidency”267. According to the Riga Joint Declaration, the “participants 
welcome the progress made in defining a stronger basis for an upgraded contractual framework 
for EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations in all areas of mutual interest268”. As there were no 
tangible results, no scores are assigned.  
Belarus 
The presidency did manage to make progress in the bilateral relations with Belarus in the area 
of migration and mobility. In June, the Justice and Home Affairs Council confirmed the 
“agreement on the Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between Belarus and 
the European Union269”. During the presidency, an “agreement was also reached about the 
Readmission Agreement” and “progress was made in the negotiations on the Visa Facilitation 
Agreement”270. GA can therefore be scored as “high”. It’s clear that the presidency aimed to do 
more with Belarus than the other presidencies, as already in the beginning of January, Latvia's 
Foreign Ministry State Secretary Andrejs Pildegovics visited Minks to meet with Belarus’ 
Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei and discussed the “prospects of bilateral political dialogue” 
between the EU and Belarus271. Thanks to Riga’s proactive position and key role in facilitating 
contacts between Minks and the EU272, the presidency’s contribution in the final outcome in 
                                                          
266 Ibid 
267 Trend News Agency. 2015. “Co-op with Azerbaijan priority for Latvia’s EU Council presidency, FM says”.: 
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268 Council of the European Union. 2015. „Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, Latvia“. 
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Minister”. http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-has-window-of-opportunity-to-improve-belarus-relations-says-
latvian-minister-1425742335 
66 
 
the mobility and visa negotiations can be moderately ascribed to the presidency. AS is still 
“none”, as Belarus is not mentioned in any of the provisional Council meetings agendas273. 
Georgia 
The presidency aimed to “proceed with the implementation of the DCFTA” with Georgia274 
(the AA with Georgia was signed in 2014). In the end the “participants of the Riga Summit 
reviewed and welcomed the signing and provisional application of the AA with Georgia” and 
stressed that the “implementation of AA/DCFTAs will be a top priority of the EU and the 
partners for the coming years"275. In addition to the AA/DCFTA, the Summit gave a “clear 
message that the Visa Liberalization Action Plan will be prepared at the end of 2015” if the 
“remaining criteria will be fulfilled”276, but Georgia “did not receive what it was hoping for”, 
as it had been “discussing the non-visa regime for a long time, at the same time successfully 
implementing several important prerequisites”277 and hoped to secure a visa liberalization 
agreement with the EU278 (GA is low). Other than commenting on the already achieved results, 
the presidency did not deliver any tangible results with regards to Georgia (AS and AFO are 
“none”).  
Moldova 
Other than the Latvian Foreign Minister chairing the first Association Council between the EU 
and Moldova on behalf of the EU High Representative, where they “reconfirmed the common 
will to implement their commitments regarding Moldova´s political association and economic 
integration with the EU”279, no other bilateral results were achieved with Moldova. By the 
beginning of the Riga EaP Summit, most “EU Member States had ratified the AA and the 
DCFTA between the EU and Moldova” and “other Member States were encouraged to ratify 
                                                          
273 Council of the European Union. 2014. „Provisional agendas for Council meetings, during the first semester of 
2015 (Latvian Presidency)“. 17114/14. 
274 “The programme of the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union”. 2015. 
275 Council of the European Union. 2015. „Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, Latvia“. 
276 „Results of the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union”. 2015: 59. 
277 Latvian Information Agency. 2015. „MEP Mamikins calls Latvian presidency „disaster and shame“. 
278 Financial Times. 2015. „Georgia hopes over Europe turn to dissapoitment“. 
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279 Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union press release. 2015. “The first Association Council 
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the agreements as soon as possible”280. Because the presidency did not set or achieve any other 
goals, no scores are given.  
Ukraine 
Searching for a common solution for the events unleashed by the 2013 Vilnius EaP Summit 
continued during the Latvian Presidency by “approving a package of measures for the 
implementation of the Minks Agreements under the Normandy format281”. The Foreign Affairs 
Council met in an extraordinary meeting on 29 January to hold an “in-depth discussion on the 
latest escalation of violence in Ukraine” and agreed to “extend the restrictive measures targeting 
persons and entities for threatening or undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”282, but the presidency did not have much say in the agenda or the final outcomes of 
the meeting. Instead, the most tangible result was a the comprehensive Joint Declaration issues 
at the Riga EaP Summit where all participants called for de-escalating and finding a political 
solution “based on respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity283” 
(AS is limited). In addition to this and following the signing of the AA with Ukraine in 2014, 
the presidency aimed to proceed with the “implementation of the DCFTA with Ukraine284” and 
welcomed the “provisional application of the DCFTA starting on 1 January 2016285” (GA is 
high). AFO is moderate, as the presidency did manage to play a contact facilitating role between 
the EU and Ukraine286.  
Multilateral track 
Eastern Partnership Summit 
The Riga EaP Summit was held on 21-22 May and was largely a modest event, with no real 
breakthroughs. It reconfirmed the EU’s “commitment to the Eastern Partnership” and “charting 
a positive agenda for the future”287. The overall aim was to “promote political and economic 
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281 Ibid: 63.  
282 Council of the European Union press release. 2015. „Outcome of the 3369th Council meeting“. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/01/st05755_en15_pdf/ 
283 Council of the European Union. 2015. „Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, Latvia“. 
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285 Council of the European Union. 2015. „Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, Latvia“. 
286 The Wall Street Journal. 2015. “EU has Window of Opportunity to improve Belarus Relations, Says Latvian 
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contacts, further expansion of a visa-free travel areas to Moldova and Belarus, and increased 
involvement of civil society288. One of the biggest disappointments was the presidency’s failure 
to secure a visa liberalization agreement with Georgia (GA is therefore limited). Instead, the 
Summit “reaffirmed that the EaP is a strategic and ambitious EU policy that continues to 
develop”, and “outlined a clear vision of this policy’s future up until the next Summit in 2017” 
with the declaration “reflecting the EU’s vision on further development of the cooperation 
among the partner countries”289. The visa free regime for Moldovan citizens has been in place 
since 2014, but the negotiations with Belarus on mobility related issues did move forward 
during the Summit290. AS and AFO are both limited, as the presidency managed to get all the 
participants to sign a rather comprehensive Joint Declaration, which included a call to de-
escalate the conflict in Ukraine291. Other than that, the various agreements mentioned in the 
Joint Declaration were mostly negotiation before the Summit (or before the presidency).  
Democracy, good governance and stability 
The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum was held in Riga on 20-21 May and “provided a 
platform for representatives of civil society, non-governmental organizations and think-tanks 
to debate Eastern Partnership issues292”. The event was organized by the Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs, the Centre for East European Policy Studies and the Latvian Transatlantic 
Organization. The fifth annual meeting of the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities 
for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) was also organized by the EU Committee of the 
Region and “discussed the current state of affairs and challenges in EU’s Eastern 
Neighborhood293”. The presidency also organized an expert meeting of the EaP Panel on Public 
Administration Reform with a theme of “boosting the administrative capacity of regional and 
local governments in the EaP countries294” (GA is high). AS is low because the first two events 
are organized annually. For the expert meeting, the presidency did manage to secure a list of 
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high level speakers from Latvia, other member states and partner countries (AFO is 
moderate)295.  
Economic integration and convergence with EU policies 
The 3rd Eastern Partnership Business Forum entitled “Cooperation across Borders: Eastern 
Partnership and Beyond” took place “with the support of the Employers’ Confederation of 
Latvia296. The presidency also organized several events in cooperation with the Commission. 
In the framework of the Digital Europe priority, the presidency organized the first Eastern 
Partnership Ministerial Meeting on the Digital Economy297. The Commission “signed a €13 
million contract to expand connectivity in the EaP countries298” and launched the EaPConnect 
project, which aims to connect the EU and partner country academic and research communities. 
The EaP Ministerial Meeting on Trade was held on 7 May with the aim of discussing the 
“progress in trade and the opportunities and challenges to further development of a successful 
trade dimension299”. In the field of transportation, the presidency organized the Eastern 
Partnership Integrated Border Management expert meeting with a focus on “irregular migration, 
border security, customs matters, transit procedures and the Eastern partners transport 
networks300”. Although the achieved goals reflected its priorities, the presidency organized 
most of these events in cooperation with the Commission (AS and AFO are moderate).  
Energy security 
Other than the EU and partner countries jointly promising to promote an „open policy on energy 
security, transportation and supply“ and welcoming the „progress in the negotiations for 
Georgia’s accession to the Energy Community“301, the presidency did not achieve much in the 
framework of the multilateral EaP energy security platform. Most of the projects and 
agreements discussed in the Riga Joint Declaration were already ongoing before the start of the 
Latvian Presidency. Therefore no scores are given. 
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Contacts between people 
In cooperation with the Commission, the presidency planned and organized the 2nd Eastern 
Partnership Youth Forum, held on 11-12 February. The Forum focused on „youth employment 
and cross-sectoral cooperation in the area of youth302“. The presidency also welcomed Moldova 
and Ukraine to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation program. Moldova secured full access 
already in 2014303 and Ukraine chose to „participate following the beginning of provisional 
application of the EU-Ukraine AA304. Goal achievement is high, but the presidency was not 
involved in the agenda-setting process305 and the influence it exerted on the final outcomes is 
questionable (AS and AFO are both „none“).  
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Table 11. Latvian Council Presidency influence scorecard. 
Bilateral track Multilateral track 
Armenia GA High to 
considerable 
EaP 
Summit 
GA Limited to 
moderate 
AS Limited to 
moderate 
AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO None AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Azerbaijan GA - Democracy, 
good 
governance 
and stability 
 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS - AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO - AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Belarus GA High Economic 
integration 
and 
convergence 
with EU 
policies 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS None AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Georgia GA Limited to 
moderate 
Energy 
security 
GA - 
AS None AS - 
AFO None AFO - 
Moldova GA - Contacts 
between 
people 
GA High to 
considerable 
AS - AS None 
AFO - AFO None 
Ukraine GA High to 
considerable 
AS Limited to 
moderate 
AFO Limited to 
moderate 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
3.7 Results, comparison and analytical conclusions  
The aim of this subchapter is to compare the three Council Presidencies in light of the results 
and to determine which hypothesis turned out to be more accurate. Table 12 below presents a 
side by side color coded summary of all three presidency’s final scores on both the bilateral and 
multilateral tracks.   
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The overall goal achievement was quite high for all three cases. The Polish and Lithuanian 
Presidencies both failed to make progress with Belarus, while Latvia reached its goals. 
Lithuania also failed to make progress with Ukraine, but this is understandable since the non-
signing of the AA was not entirely the fault of the presidency. Latvia also failed to make 
progress with Azerbaijan and Moldova, but this can be attributed to the waning interest of 
Azerbaijan in the EaP and Moldova successfully signing the AA/DCFTA with the EU. Overall, 
the three presidencies exerted similar amount of influence on the multilateral track, with all 
three failing to deliver any results in the energy security platform. On the bilateral track, Poland 
did exert more influence on the agenda, especially compared to Lithuania (no influence at all). 
Poland also managed to exert limited influence on the final outcomes in all cases except 
Belarus, while both Lithuania managed to exert influence on two cases (Georgia and Moldova) 
and Latvia moderately influenced the relations with Armenia and Ukraine. The overall picture 
shows that the Polish Presidency did manage to exert more influence on the bilateral track than 
the two small presidencies. This outcomes does seem to echo with Jean-Claude Juncker and his 
statement that “the big are more big on big things, and small on small things”306. The 
multilateral track is obviously more easily influenced than the bilateral track, which entails 
signing agreements that have in some cases been in “negotiation limbo” for years.  
Its’s also obvious that Lithuania and Latvia exerted more influence on the multilateral than on 
the bilateral track, meaning that the hypothesis 1B is true: small states have more influence on 
multilateral relationships than on bilateral. Multilateral track might be easier to influence, as it 
does not require partners to sign any agreements, such as the AA or DCFTAs. The second set 
of hypothesis inquired whether small states have more influence on the agenda (AS) or on the 
final outcomes (AFO). In the bilateral track, the Lithuanian Presidency only managed to 
influence the final outcomes in two cases – Georgia and Moldova. The Latvian Presidency 
managed to exert equal amounts of influence on both the agenda and on the final outcomes.  
                                                          
306 European Commission press conference. 2014. “The Juncker Commission: The Right Team to Deliver 
Change”. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-585_en.htm 
Table 12. Comparing the influence of Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian Presidencies of the Council of the EU on the Eastern Partnership initiative. 
 Polish Presidency Lithuanian Presidency Latvian Presidency 
Bilateral track GA AS AFO GA AS AFO GA AS AFO 
Armenia Limited High Limited  Limited None None High Limited None 
Azerbaijan Limited High Limited Limited None None - - - 
Belarus None None None None - - High None Limited 
Georgia High None Limited High None Limited Limited None None 
Moldova Limited None Limited High None Limited - - - 
Ukraine Limited None Limited None None None High Limited Limited 
Multilateral track    
EaP Summit Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited 
Democracy and stability  Limited Limited Limited High Limited Limited High Limited Limited 
Economy and EU policies - - Limited High Limited Limited High Limited Limited 
Energy security - - - - - - - - - 
Contact between people High Limited Limited High Limited Limited High None None 
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
 
Together the two small states managed to exert limited amount of influence on the agenda two 
times (Latvia on Armenia and Ukraine) and four times on the final outcomes. Both presidencies 
exerted equal amount of influence on the multilateral track on both the agenda and on the final 
outcomes. Thought the difference between the two cases is quite narrow, hypothesis 2B is true 
in this case. This is bolstered by the results from the Polish Presidency, which also exerted more 
influence on the final outcomes than on the agenda. The reason is that the agendas in the 
bilateral track were already set in stone before the start of each presidency and therefore hard 
for each individual presidency to influence.  
The third set if hypothesis is the trickiest: whether the overall goal achievement level is higher 
when the level of ascription is lower or when it’s higher. It seems that the Commission (and 
other actors) still have a lot to say on what ends up in the agenda and what the final outcome 
really is, as GA in the bilateral track is usually high (1 case) or limited (3 cases) even when 
AFO is “none”. When GA is limited, the final outcome tends to be also “none” and when GA 
is high (3 cases), AFO is limited (4 cases). This tells us that the presidencies do have some 
influence, but without the support of other actors, the likelihood of failing to deliver results 
would be higher. This confirms hypothesis 3B: the overall goal achievement level is higher 
when the level of ascription is higher.  
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CONCLUSION  
Small states as research subjects have been dividing the scholarly community since the 
establishment of International Relations as a research field. The field has largely been divided 
on the subject of small state influence – some scholars, notably realists, claim that small states 
have only a marginal role to play in international affairs, while others argue the opposite. The 
aim of this thesis was to challenge the assumption that the influence of small member states on 
the EU’s foreign policy is negligible. I intended to answer four questions: first, can small EU 
member states influence EU foreign policy? Second, how can we explain their potential 
influence? Third, how can we “measure” influence? And fourth, how much influence have they 
actually exerted?  
The first part of the thesis focused on the behavior of small states. I discussed the difficulty in 
conceptualizing “small states” using different variables and methods. I then proceeded to define 
small member states using the number of members of parliament (MP’s) in the European 
Parliament (EP). The next part of the chapter focused on the small state literature in both IR in 
general and in the subfield of EU studies, tracking the historical events, the dominant IR 
theories that influenced the field, and the main small state topics that were popular in each 
historical period. The final part of the chapter presented three factors that, in accord with this 
thesis, adequately explain the influence of small member states in EU foreign policy: first is 
commitment to an issue and the general salience of a policy issue; second, a forerunner 
reputation, expertise in a policy issue and/or possession of content and procedural knowledge; 
and third, using the rotating Council Presidency of the EU to one’s own advantage.  
The second part of the thesis presented the research method used to measure small state 
influence. I discussed the small-N research design, the selection of cases and data and presented 
three sets of competing hypothesis to be tested. The first set of hypothesis questioned whether 
small states have more influence on the bilateral or on the multilateral Eastern Partnership track, 
the second set of hypothesis asked whether small member states have more influence on the 
agenda or on the final outcomes, and the third set whether the overall goal achievement level is 
higher when the level of ascription is lower or higher. In the last part of the chapter I 
operationalized “influence” and presented the “influence measuring” framework to be used in 
the thesis. I used a modified version of Vandecasteele’s et al (2014) framework and argued that 
three indicators should be used in order to comfortably assess the scale of small member state 
influence on the EU’s foreign policy: goal achievement, the ascription of agenda setting, and 
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the ascription of final outcomes. Each indicators was measured on a three level scale: none, 
limited to moderate influence, considerable to high influence.  
The third and most important chapter analyzed and compared the Council Presidencies of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland using the theoretical and methodological framework discussed in 
the two previous chapters. First I gave a brief overview of the European Neighborhood Policy 
and the Eastern Partnership initiative. I then continued on to discuss the commitment to the EaP 
initiative and the immaterial resources of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. I argued that all three 
cases were heavily involved and committed to developing the Eastern Partnership initiative 
with Latvia and Lithuania prioritizing the EaP and Poland going more for an “all-in-one” type 
of Council Presidency. Also, both Latvia and Lithuania presented their post-Soviet 
development experience as a resource third countries can use and benefit from. The next part 
of the chapter argued that member states acting as small “smart states” have in theory a greater 
chance to influence initiatives and further their interests. Both Latvia and Lithuania maintained 
focus on the EaP and aimed to use their Council Presidency’s to the fullest, but at the same time 
also kept broader EU interests in mind. 
The final part of the chapter assessed the extent of influence exerted on both the bilateral and 
the multilateral track of the EaP. Each case then produced a final “scorecard”. This exercise 
revealed three conclusions: first, that hypothesis 1B was true and small states have more 
influence on multilateral relationships than on bilateral; second, that hypothesis 2B is true and 
small member states have more influence on the final outcomes than on the agenda; and third, 
it confirmed that hypothesis 3B is true and the overall goal achievement level is higher when 
the level of ascription is higher. Based on the results this thesis has produced, we can conclude 
that small member states are able to exert a limited amount of influence on the EU’s foreign 
policy when they use their strengths and resources to leverage their positions vis-à-vis bigger 
and more powerful member states, but without the support of other actors, the probability of 
failing to deliver results would be higher.  
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LÜHIKOKKUVÕTE 
Lõputöö eesmärk on analüüsida väikeste liikmesriikide mõju Euroopa Liidu ühises 
välispoliitikas. Selleks uurin kahe väikeriigi, Läti ja Leedu, suutlikust ELi Nõukogu 
eesistujariigi perioodil mõjutada ühte liidu suurimat välispoliitilist initsiatiivi – Idapartnerlust. 
Selleks, et teha nüansirikkamaid järeldusi, võrdlen Läti ja Leedu juhtumit Poola eesistujariigi 
perioodiga. Antud tees lisab olemasolevale väikeriikide kirjandusele kolmel viisil: esiteks, 
annab see põhjaliku ülevaate klassikalisest ja kaasaegsest väikeriikide kirjandusest ning hindab 
kriitiliselt realismist tulenevat tõlgendust väikeriikide käitumisest rahvusvahelises süsteemis; 
teiseks annab töö ülevaate erinevatest metodoloogiatest ja sünteesib uue „mõju“ mõõtmise 
raamistiku; ja kolmandaks, mõõdab antud raamistiku abil kolme juhtumi mõju Idapartnerluse 
initsiatiivile.  
Töös väida, et kõige adekvaatsemalt seletavad väikeste liikmesriikide mõju EL välispoliitikas 
kolm tegurit: esiteks pühendumus poliitikavaldkonnale – prioritiseeritud teema peab olema 
neile üldise tähtsusega; teiseks on väikeriikidel suurem tõenäosus poliitikavaldkonda mõjutada, 
kui nad omavad teatud mittemateriaalseid ressursse (tunnustatud liidrid mingis valdkonnas või 
omavad antud valdkonnas eksperditeadmisi); ja kolmandaks avaldavad väikeriigid 
poliitikavaldkonnale suuremat mõju, kui nad suudavad enda kasuks ära kasutada Euroopa Liidu 
institutsioonilist raamistikku (näiteks EL Nõukogu eesistujariigi rolli). Mõju ulatuse 
mõõtmiseks kasutan kolme indikaatorit: eesmärgi saavutamise ulatus, mõju ulatuse omistamine 
päevakorrale, ja mõju ulatuse omistamine lõpptulemustele. Juhtumite mõjuulatuste mõõtmisel 
ja võrdlemisel selgus kolm lõppjäreldust: esiteks on väikestel liikmesriikidel suurem mõju 
multilateraalsetele Idapartnerluse platvormidele kui bilateraalsetele suhetele; teiseks suudavad 
väikesed liikmesriigid mõjutada rohkem lõpptulemusi kui esmast päevakorda; ja kolmandaks 
selgus, et eesmärkide saavutamise tase on kõrgem siis, kui üleüldine omistamise tase on samuti 
kõrge. Saadud tulemuste põhjal võib järeldada, et väikesed liikmesriigid on võimelised 
mõjutama piiratud määral Euroopa Liidu ühist välispoliitikat siis, kui nad kasutavad enda 
tugevusi ja ressursse ära nii, et suudavad enda positsiooni suuremate ja võimsamate 
liikmesriikidega võrreldes võimendada. Siiski tuleb pidada silmas ka asjaolu, et ilma teiste 
tegutsejate toetuse ja panuseta on tõenäosus üksi mõju avaldada väiksem kui koostööd tehes.  
 
